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 Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, the British Navy went through a 
development of its leadership that drastically changed its spirit and culture. After the court-
martial and execution of Admiral John Byng for failing to relieve the British forces on the island 
of Minorca, the leadership in the British Navy took on a more aggressive posture and took more 
risks than in earlier periods. These changes in leadership were reinforced by the repeated success 
of naval leaders who experienced success through unconventional and aggressive combat tactics.  
However, combat tactics were not the sole source of British naval success. British naval 
officers learned their craft through a proven and comprehensive process of development that 
gave them a distinct advantage over their enemies. By the time the vast majority of officers 
received their commission as an officer, they were already thoroughly experienced with 
seamanship and had a chance to develop a leadership style which carried on with them 
throughout their careers. 
The unconventional tactics, the culture of aggressiveness, and the process of career 
development of British naval leaders are personified in several prominent naval leaders of the 
second half of the eighteenth century. This work explores these leadership characteristics in 
Admiral Richard Howe, Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson, Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, 
and Admiral Edward Pellew. 
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The wind blew hard across the waters of Portsmouth, England on March 14th, 
1757, whipping and cracking pennants and signal flags among the naval ships anchored 
in the harbor. Amongst all the flags of canvas and silk fluttering in the wind, Admiral 
John Byng knelt down on the quarterdeck of the ship, Monarch, holding a silk 
handkerchief in his hand. In front of him stood three files of three Royal Marines, the 
firing squad with orders to execute him. Admiral Byng tied the handkerchief around his 
eyes. Then he held up a second handkerchief. It blew in the wind like the proud flags of 
the British Navy in the harbor, and throughout the world. A marine Captain ordered the 
marines to cock the flintlocks on their muskets. Byng dropped the second handkerchief, it 
was tossed in the wind and fell to the deck. The marines fired their muskets, instantly 
killing Byng. The small silk handkerchief falling from Byng’s hand was symbolic of a 
new beginning in British naval leadership. 
During the second half of the eighteenth century, leadership in the British Navy 
went through a profound evolution. The officers that served in the navy, and the policies 
directing their actions, developed from a posture of steady but stagnant to bold and 
daring. Bold and daring, coupled with unmatched experience and knowledge led the 
leaders and officers of the British Navy to be the critical factor in the success of Great 
Britain’s foreign policy during some of the most contentious and significant wars in 
history. A preeminent scholar on the subject, N.A.M Rodger, describes the evolution of 
British naval leadership, “Byng’s death revived and reinforced a culture of aggressive 




which in time gave them a steadily mounting psychological ascendancy. More and more 
in the course of the century, and for long afterward, British officers encountered 
opponents who expected to be attacked, and more than half expected to be beaten so that 
they went into action with an invisible disadvantage which no amount of personal 
courage or numerical strength could entirely make up for.”1 
From the time of Admiral John Byng, and his controversial execution for failing 
to relieve the siege on the British forces on Minorca, to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, 
British Naval leadership was infused with a culture of resolve, and a sense of superiority. 
Byng’s execution signaled a symbolic change from a tendency for careful consideration 
to a spirit of tenacity. This new spirit was championed early on by Admiral Edward Lord 
Hawke and perfected nearly half a century later by Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson. The 
examples of Hawke and Nelson, and the many other leaders exhibiting this new spirit of 
tenacity permeated throughout the entire navy. The aura of preeminence exhibited by the 
leaders caused the British seamen to take on the same sense of superiority and develop 
into an unrivaled fighting force. During the period of this study, the British Navy was 
truly superior to its enemies in naval fleet actions. Their enemies were devastated by the 
unorthodox fleet techniques employed by this new breed of officer, and the tenacity of 
the British officers and seamen. The leadership of those officers and the naval dominance 
they accomplished laid the foundations for the global hegemony of Britain during the 
nineteenth century. 
                                                 
1 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britian: 1649-1815 (New York: W. W. 




Through these experiences of victory and the resultant tradition of excellence, 
British naval officers arose to represent a distinguished and prominent military and 
diplomatic power. However, even among these dominant naval officers, there was a 
higher tier. This exalted group of officers could inspire the men under their command to 
achieve feats deemed impossible by the standards of the time. They galvanized their 
commands into well-balanced teams through genuine paternal compassion, heroic 
personifications, and an unwavering expectation for the very best performance from their 
men. These leaders used their natural and learned leadership skills to attain victory for 
Britain time after time. 
The tradition of success and the global naval hegemony of the British Navy is a 
direct result of the leadership of the Navy’s officers during the period of this study. These 
officers operated in a complex and demanding period. They served in multiple theatres of 
war; from the Mediterranean Sea to the Carribean Sea, and in their home waters in the 
North Sea and the English Channel. In order to understand how the results achieved by 
the British Navy during the period have been received and considered by historians and 
scholars, this study will begin with an overview of naval history encompassing the 
period.  
Historiography 
The amount of scholarship concerning British Naval leadership during the period 
between the Seven Years’ War and the end of the Napoleonic Wars is, for lack of better 
terms, shocking. Libraries of the world’s leading universities are packed full of books and 
journals concerning the British Navy and its officers. Many of these resources outline the 




British government ministries throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
However, because of the tendency for many of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century scholars to adopt a “great men” perspective when analyzing the subject, the vast 
majority of early scholarly works focus on biographical accounts of naval officers.  
Among writings contemporary to the period, there is an astonishing dearth of 
work by naval officers serving in the British Navy. The lack of scholarship is surprising 
considering naval officers were usually proficient in writing the official correspondences 
and ships’ logs. Unfortunately, there are no enduring works of historical analysis by 
serving naval officers of the period; even though they provided a plethora of primary 
source material consisting of correspondences and diaries written by them. The insights 
researchers have pulled from these sources piece together a history seen through a lens of 
official communications and the personal letters which conform to the formal social 
norms of the time. Communications and letters of this type make critical analysis 
difficult.  
There are three shining lights of surprise among the available contemporary 
sources. They are three popular social histories written by British seaman; Robert Hay’s 
Landsman Hay,2 Williams Spravens’ Memoirs of a Seafaring Life,3 and William 
Robinson’s Jack Nastyface.4 These three books offer a view of British naval leadership 
from the perspective of one taking orders instead of issuing them. They discuss the 
effects an officer could have on morale, whether positive or negative. Hay gives a unique 
perspective from a seaman who worked up the courage to attempt desertion from the 
                                                 
2 Robert Hay, Landsman Hay (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2010), 78. 
3 William Spravens, Memoirs of a Seafaring Life (London: The Bath Press, 2000). 




Navy. Spravens’ book explains the desire and benefits of a seaman who attempts to 
remain attached to officers who treat the men well and avoid those officers who were 
harsh. Although the works are not meant to be works of historical analysis, they 
indirectly enlighten the reader to their unique personal analysis of the period. Robinson’s 
book was especially helpful to confirm the adulation Horatio Nelson’s seamen had for 
him, and the abusive conduct of some of the more authoritarian British naval officers. 
Within a decade of the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the first historical work 
arrived with Williams James’ six volumes of The Naval History of Great Britain: From 
the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV.5 James’ work 
was comprehensive, and his successors had a hard time improving on the thoroughness of 
his work. After all, James was an attorney in the Jamaica Prize courts during the 
Napoleonic Wars and had an authoritative understanding of the naval operations of the 
period. However, his history reads like a chronological log of events, with nautical and 
tactical considerations detailed to an almost ponderous extent. The work did not 
illuminate aspects of leadership. However, it set the stage for subsequent works to expand 
the subject. In 1847, Nicholas Nichols wrote A History of the Royal Navy from the 
Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution6 in two volumes. This work was the 
first history to consider some of the social aspects of the Navy, including manning, pay, 
and discipline. The second volume covers the period of our study, and although it 
                                                 
5 William James, The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France, in February 
1793 : To the Accession of George Iv. In January 1820 (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1822). 
6 Nicholas Harris Sir Nicolas, A History of the Royal Navy, from the Earliest Times to the Wars of the 




discusses some social aspects, the work does not cover or identify leadership 
characteristics with any depth. 
With the advent of the “great men” theory of history, biographies of British naval 
officers became an important part of the historiography of the period. Most prominent 
among these “great men” was Horatio Nelson, the universal hero of Great Britain. More 
biographies have been written about Nelson than almost every other naval officer of the 
period combined. One book, in particular, Alfred Mahan’s The Life of Nelson,7 was the 
standard of Nelson biographies for nearly a century from its publishing in 1897. Mahan 
indeed saw history as guided by the actions and thoughts of prominent figures. To 
Mahan, Nelson was the supreme example; hence his almost adoring subtitle for the book: 
The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. A bold subtitle. For someone to be 
considered the ‘embodiment’ of British sea power, the nation that boasts the infamous 
‘wall of oak,' they would have to be a monument of courage and leadership. Mahan 
skillfully expresses Nelson’s strategic thinking, tactical abilities, and innate leadership 
characteristics. 
The twentieth century included many wars across the world and also saw a 
decrease in publications about eighteenth-century military history. Many historians were 
distracted by the intense naval campaigns that encompassed the first have of the century 
and the Cold War conflict arms race that took place in the second half of the century.  
                                                 
7 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain., 2 vols. 




However, there was an increase in fictional writing about the period of this study, 
including Jack London’s Seawolf 8, C.S. Forester’s Horatio Hornblower series of novels, 
and Patrick O’Brian’s Aubrey-Maturin series of novels. These works of fiction touch on 
the twentieth century’s nostalgic look at the past, when wars were conducted with 
gentlemanly honor, chivalry, and close combat, as opposed to the detached modern wars 
of underwater submarine operations, long-range artillery, and air combat. 
There were still some scholarly works about the British Navy and its leadership 
during the twentieth century. Alfred Mahan continued his scholarship on the period of 
this study when he wrote The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American 
Independence in 1913.9 In this book, Mahan outlines the critical naval actions of the War 
of American Independence and gives background to the conflicts and context to the 
specific battles. In 1926, William James, a Captain in the Royal Navy, wrote The British 
Navy in Adversity10 which was an early look at naval leadership during the War of 
American Independence. James lamented the British planning and leadership that led to 
the struggles Britain faced in America at the time. 
During the middle of the twentieth century, there was a flurry of histories written 
on the Battle of Trafalgar, and Vice-Admiral Nelson’s success in the battle. These works 
were Oliver Warner’s Trafalgar11 in 1959, Donald Macintyre’s Trafalgar: Nelson’s 
Great Victory12 in 1968, and David Howarth’s Trafalgar: The Nelson Touch13 in 1969. 
                                                 
8 Jack London, The Sea-Wolf (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904). 
9 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston, and Company, 1913). 
10 W. M. James, The British Navy in Adversity : A Study of the War of American Independence (London: 
Longmans & Co., 1926). 
11 Oliver Warner, Trafalgar (London: Batsford, 1959). 
12 Donald G. F. W. Macintyre, Trafalgar: Nelson's Great Victory (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968). 




These works describe the events of the battle in light of Nelson’s leadership and hero 
status. 
 In 1960, Michael Lewis made an essential contribution to the study of British 
naval leadership with his book A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815.14 Lewis’ book 
steered clear of an analysis of the battles fought by the British Navy. Instead, he focuses 
on the lives of the men on the British ships. His study included an outline of careers and 
living conditions of the seamen and officers. The book gives an excellent view of the 
interaction between the ships officers and the seamen under their command. Another 
book that focused on the lives and interactions of officers and seamen in the British 
Navy, instead of the specific battles they were involved in, was N.A.M. Rodger’s 1986 
book, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy.15 Rodger’s book explores 
the complex ‘world’ of life onboard a British naval warship; focusing on an inward view 
of the interactions within a ship instead of an outward look at naval battles or naval 
administration unless necessary. 
At the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, interest grew 
among scholars of the period into the social history of the British navy. Also, with the 
increase in the late twentieth century of leadership studies in the sociology and business 
fields, researchers started to look back in history for examples of leadership; many of 
those researchers re-discovered the leadership traits of the British Naval leaders of the 
late eighteenth century. These scholars tended to look for those aspects of leadership 
which affected the interpersonal relationships between officers and seaman and focuses 
                                                 
14 Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London: Chatham, 1960). 




on the human condition within the Navy. This trend brought several new biographies of 
Nelson which have become welcome additions to the field. During the bicentenary of 
Nelson’s victory and death at the Battle of Trafalgar, three crucial historical works on 
Nelson were published; Colin White’s Nelson: The New Letters16, Andrew Lambert’s 
Nelson: Britannia’s God of War17, and Roger Knight’s The Pursuit of Victory: The Life 
and Achievement of Horatio Nelson18. All of these books contributed to the better 
understanding of the leadership qualities of Nelson and pointed out specific factors for 
the success of his command and the esprit de corps on board his ships. 
It is evident there is a tendency for historians to focus on Nelson’s exploits, and 
there are good reasons to do so; his success was unrivaled, his personality was inviting 
and intense, and his personal life bordered on scandalous. However, British naval 
leadership in this period was made up of several great leaders. Unfortunately, the 
historiography of the leadership qualities of these other British naval leaders is 
incomplete. There are books written about John Jervis, Cuthbert Collingwood, Richard 
Howe, and others; but the works pale in comparison to the scholarship recorded on 
Nelson. This paper will hopefully fill in the gaps among these great leaders. 
Continuing the research into the social history of British naval leadership, Evan 
Wilson’s The Social History of British Naval Officers, 1775-181519  gives tremendous 
insight into the inner workings of a naval officer’s career. Wilson includes the good and 
                                                 
16 Colin White, Nelson, the New Letters (Woodbridge, Suffolk ; Rochester, NY: Boydell Press in 
association with the National Maritime Museum and the Royal Navy Museum, 2005). 
17 Andrew D. Lambert, Nelson : Britannia's God of War (London: Faber and Faber, 2004). 
18 Roger Knight, The Pursuit of Victory : The Life and Achievement of Horatio Nelson (London: Allen 
Lane, 2005). 





bad aspects of the practice of patronage among officers and how it could enhance careers. 
This book is the culmination of years of painstaking academic work and research into the 
lives and culture of British naval officers. He highlights the process of an officer’s career, 
instead of the more common focus on battles and sea tactics. Wilson’s perspective on 
naval officers helps to illuminate the timeline of a naval officer's career; from a nearly 
helpless and unformed young gentleman to commissioned sea officer. Not only does 
Wilson outline the careers of these officers, but he also helps researchers understand 
many of the motivations of these officers and their complex interactions with each other 
and British society in general. Wilson’s book can sometimes give a reader the idea that he 
is privy to a world hidden from most scholarship, a world of sometimes dishonorable 
greed for prize money, nepotism, and toadying to patrons. 
Another important work examining British naval leadership is Tom Wareham’s 
The Star Captains: Frigate Command in the Napoleonic Wars.20 In his book, Wareham 
discusses the careers and exploits of the little known or remembered captains of British 
frigate ships. Although large fleet actions served in battleships highlighted the careers of 
many of the most prominent British naval officers, nearly all officers served some time in 
frigates or ships under the rating, and most likely had the same experiences of command 
as the less known and forgotten frigate captains. Wareham examines frigates and their 
commanding officers and contends that some of the most significant naval strategic 
operations were carried out by these ships. The importance of frigates to the strategic 
                                                 
20 Tom Wareham, The Star Captains : Frigate Command in the Napoleonic Wars (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 




mission of the British Navy bolsters Wareham’s interest in the leadership abilities of the 
captains of the ships. 
The historiography of the subject would never be complete without addressing the 
monumental work of the Naval Records Society (NRS). Since 1893, the society has 
produced 162 volumes of different materials about the history of the British Navy. Their 
volumes include collections of letters and documents that help document in detail the 
Navy’s history. The editors’ introduction to each section and volume uncover useful and 
pertinent details about the primary sources and how they can be utilized by scholars of 
the subject matter. 
The Naval Records Society’s volumes contain an almost endless supply of 
primary source material for research into this subject matter. This paper will rely heavily 
on those sources to bring to light the leadership characteristics of many of the naval 
leaders of the period. Of the 162 volumes, over fifty of them contain the letters, 
correspondences, or journals of many of the naval leaders of the period of this study. 
Although much of the work on eighteenth-century naval leadership has focused 
heavily on the British officer corps, important studies of naval officers from other 
European countries has added depth and breadth to the historiography. Raoul Castex 
offers one of the most wholly Francophile perspectives on naval leadership. Although not 
a contemporary of the period, Castex offers a French viewpoint to naval officers of the 
late eighteenth century. His expertise comes from his naval career and extensive study of 
naval strategy and leadership. His works of the early twentieth century are widely 




Strategiques21, offers a blistering critique of the French strategy for world power during 
the second half of the eighteenth century. The critique focuses on the attempt by the 
French forces to match Britain in every theater of war, instead of offering a consolidated 
force in any one theater of conflict. Castex contends that the French strategy left their 
resources spread thinly over many different theaters of war. Although his point of view is 
French, it is an important consideration for this work, as the French were the primary 
antagonists for the British naval officers of the period. The work offers an opportunity to 
compare and contrast British and French leadership. 
Another important work about the French Navy is William Cormack’s book, 
Revolution & Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794.22 This book outlines the 
drastic loss of leadership the French Navy experienced when many of the navy’s officers 
emigrated to avoid persecution during the revolution. The French Navy suffered from a 
lack of leadership until some of the émigrés returned from abroad and the country was 
able to train a new officer corps. 
With the vast resources available concerning British naval officers, the 
opportunity for scholars to study and fill in missing pieces of information on leadership 
characteristics should be plentiful. Understanding what characteristics encouraged British 
seaman to follow these officers, and how those officers utilized these characteristics to 
                                                 
21 Raoul Castex, Theories Strategiques, 2 vols. (Paris: Societe d' Editions Geographique, Maritimes et 
Coloniales, 1930). 
22 William S. Cormack, Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794 (Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Book review (H-Net) http://www.h-net.org/review/hrev-
a0a5i9-aa. Sample text http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/94017249.html. Publisher description 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam026/94017249.html. Table of contents 





gain victory and success is an important endeavor. Information gained from the study of 
British naval leaders will no doubt complement and enhance modern studies of military 
leadership, and scholars will likely use the material for many years to come. 
Historical Context 
1763-1778 
 The conclusion of the Seven Years War brought about a period of British 
diplomatic and military dominance outside the European environs, most notably in the 
Atlantic region. After the Treaty of Paris of 1763, British possessions in North America 
stretched from Barbados in the South to Labrador in the North. These vast colonial 
possessions soon came to be an important part of the British people’s idea of Imperial 
power. The British North American colonies became a symbol of British world 
dominance in the public’s opinion, and in turn the political leadership.23 An emphasis on 
the importance of the American colonies brought about a renewed interest in the success 
and improvement of the British Navy, the critical strategic component necessary for the 
maintenance of the colonies. 
 The renewed interest in achievements of the Navy around the world brought about 
an interest in world exploration among the British. Not only was there an interest to 
discover the unknown, but there was also an Enlightenment-inspired desire to make 
scientific and geographic discoveries throughout the world. Two expeditions which 
highlight these intentions were Captain Cook’s expedition to the South Pacific and 
Captain Phipps’ voyage to the Arctic. Britain used these expeditions for another purpose 
                                                 




as well. As they developed diplomatic relationships with new trade partners they came 
into contact with, they discovered and developed new allies against France. Through 
strong economic relationships with these new allies, Britain was able to gain access to 
resources and labor. In doing so, they were able to deny France access to the same 
resources. Gaining access to resources while denying the same resources to the French 
gave the British a distinct strategic advantage in most of the world.24 
 Britain gained many essential land holdings at the end of the Seven Years War. 
However, as William Pitt, the British Prime Minister, lamented, many of the territories 
gained by the British were considered an economic burden to the French, and therefore 
the British government was seen as assuming a diverse array of burdens.25 Therefore, 
what seemed like a tremendous victory at first, before too long, started to fade in glory 
and many in British political and military circles resigned to the fact that they did not 
gain as much as they initially thought. Also, Britain had accumulated an enormous debt 
to pay for the costs of the war. They also had to pay to keep a standing army in the 
American colonies to protect the frontiers from Native American rebellions to British 
rule.26 
To pay for the enormous expenditures for war debt and the cost of retaining 
troops in the colonies, the British looked to the colonies as an excellent source of 
revenue. As the British government developed the statutes necessary to implement the 
increase in revenue, they circumvented colonial representation in the process. British 
                                                 
24 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 327-28. 
25 Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years' War (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2005)., 242. 
26 Jonathan R. Dull, The Age of the Ship of the Line : The British & French Navies, 1650-1815 (Lincoln, 




lawmakers enacted taxes on colonial trade, causing an increase in smuggling and general 
disobedience to the taxes.  
Ignoring the Colonials’ desire for representation increased resistance to the 
colonial governmental structures. The increased resistance and the precipitant potential 
for insurrection forced the British colonial governments to reevaluate their strategic troop 
deployments in North America. Therefore, many troops retreated from the frontiers and 
ensconced themselves in the colonial urban centers. The quartering of British soldiers in 
these urban areas only exasperated the resistance of the colonial people.  
The new taxes on trade led to an extensive network of smuggling by colonials 
who wished to circumvent the excise efforts of the British government. Smuggling was 
supported by trade connections developed between the colonialists and the foreign 
commercial operations of France and Spain. Britain found it necessary to use its navy to 
curtail the smuggling. The effort to prevent smuggling started a naval campaign in North 
America which proved to be more difficult than expected. The number of small ports in 
the New England area alone proved to be too numerous for the North American squadron 
to cover. They were unable to establish an effective blockade, and their efforts only 
increased the profit gained by those who were successful in the smuggling trade. 
When the War of American Independence started, Britain found itself in a 
problematic logistical situation. Never before had the British Navy supported a large 
army at such a considerable distance from the British Isles. The army was unable to 
purchase food, supplies, or transportation locally; so they were almost entirely dependent 
on the Navy to supply them with food and supplies. Dependence on the navy for supplies 




they desired. The British strategic disability on land caused by the need for naval 
resupply had the effect of balancing the overall strength of opposing forces in North 
America. It did so by reducing the fighting ability of the ground forces, and by diverting 
scarce naval resources from hunting privateers to convey operations to safeguard 
incoming supplies. 
The British Navy’s combat operations at the beginning of the war consisted of 
maintaining a blockade of the east coast of North America and enforcing a trade embargo 
in the Caribbean Sea. Also, as American privateers started preying on British merchants 
in Canada, the Caribbean, and along the East Coast of the American colonies, the British 
Navy found it necessary to start long-range patrol operations and increase convoy 
protection missions. These demands on the North American squadron were strenuous and 
stretched the ability of the British Navy. However, since the colonies did not have 
frigates or any ships of the line, the British resources that were available had little 
difficulty in maintaining dominance. However, in 1778, the war would change 
drastically, and the British naval power in North America was shaken. 
1778-1793 
On February 6th, 1778, the United States and the Kingdom of France signed the 
Franco-American Treaty of Alliance. The agreement stated: 
…in case Great Britain in Resentment of that connection and of the good 
correspondence which is the object of the said Treaty, should break the Peace 
with france, either by direct hostilities, or by hindering her commerce and 
navigation, in a manner contrary to the Rights of Nations, and the Peace 
subsisting between the two Crowns; and his Majesty and the said united States 
having resolved in that Case to join their Councils and efforts against the 




to concert the Clauses & conditions proper to fulfill the said Intentions, have, after 
the most mature Deliberation, concluded and determined on the Articles.27 
 
The agreement, in effect, guaranteed the United States and France would join 
forces militarily against Great Britain; both knowing full well the British would not allow 
French ships to bring supplies and arms to the United States. Britain would prevent the 
free commerce and navigation of French ships, triggering the military cooperation 
intended in the agreement. 
The entrance of French into the American War of Independence changed the 
strategic considerations for the British Navy. War with France necessitated the need for 
the British Navy to protect their homeland from invasion in the English Channel and the 
North Sea, as well as maintain a sufficient force in the Americas and the Mediterranean 
Sea. This challenge remained through the entire war. 
In the Americas, this challenge was felt first hand by Admiral Richard Howe, 
commander of the North American squadron. Exasperated by the lack of ships sent to 
him and distraction other campaigns were presenting to the British government; he sent 
several requests to the Admiralty for reinforcements. Finally, Lord Germain was able to 
convince the British government to send a portion of the Western Squadron to North 
America to assist Howe; but only after the French fleet in Toulon was dispatched to 
North American as well.28 
                                                 
27 David Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Treaties, 
Etc., vol. 8 v. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1931), 35-36. 




The situation only got worse in 1779, when Spain entered the war against Britain. 
Now that its Western Squadron had been weakened by sending reinforcements to North 
America, the combined threat of the remaining French fleet and the Spanish fleet made 
the threat of invasion even greater. The threat of invasion became the preeminent concern 
of the British government. Therefore, the naval commitment in North America was seen 
as a lower priority. As the War of American Independence continued, the British navy 
was unable to maintain the level of support for the land forces required to win the war.  
British efforts in the Caribbean Sea suffered as well. The combined Franco-
Spanish naval assets in the region made it very difficult for the British navy to fulfill its 
strategic mission. The Battle of Saintes occurred during this period and within this theatre 
of operation. It occurred off the coast of Dominica between Admiral Rodney’s fleet of 
thirty-seven and the French fleet of thirty-six, led by Admiral de Grasse. Poor ship-
handling by the French and an opportunistic wind shift favoring the British allowed the 
British to gain the upper hand and ultimately winning the battle.29 
Admiral de Grasse reciprocated the fortune later, in a battle known as the Battle 
of the Chesapeake; near the end of the War of American Independence. The French fleet 
had moved in mass to the Chesapeake River capes to deny Lord Cornwallis’ army 
supplies and an escape route from their position in Yorktown. A coordinated attack by 
American and French forces on land backed Cornwallis’ army into a defensive position 
and he was utterly dependent on the British Navy for support.30 
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The British fleet during the Battle of the Chesapeake, commanded by Rear 
Admiral Sir Thomas Graves, arrived after the French fleet had already anchored in the 
bay. The French fleet sallied forth from the bay and lined up for battle. The British fleet 
assumed their line of battle and approached to engage. The rear division of the British 
fleet, commanded by Admiral Samuel Hood, was unable to gain an effective battle 
position and was mostly uninvolved in the fighting of the battle. Therefore the British van 
and center divisions were greatly outnumbered. The British were repulsed by the French 
fleet and had to return to New York for repairs. 
Cornwallis was left in an indefensible position. He was surrounded on land by 
American and French forces, and the French fleet was in a position to bombard the 
British fortifications in Yorktown. Cornwallis asked for terms of the surrender of his 
forces. The surrender occurred on October 18th, about one and a half months after the 
Battle of the Chesapeake on September 5th. 
The continuance of the naval war in the Americas moved south to the Caribbean 
Sea. The British and French battled in a contest for control of strategic islands and 
seaports in the Caribbean. Toward the end of the war, the British began to gain the upper 
hand over the French, due to the strategic abilities of Admiral Hood. Dominance over the 
Caribbean Sea gave the British a strategic naval advantage, as most of the shipping trade 
to the Americas came through the Caribbean Sea on the predictable and steady trade 
winds. 
There is one more crucial strategic contest during the conflict concurrent with the 
War of American Independence. This event did not occur in North America, but on the 




port for decades and considered the defense of it as a primary concern. The British 
occupation of the port still stung at the pride and international reputation of the Spanish. 
They therefore also made it an urgent priority for their military operations. Throughout 
the war, the Spanish attempted to blockade the port and besieged it from the land. The 
British were able to hold on to the critical strategic position through careful allocation of 
resources and the tenacity of the British Navy and Army. As the period of war came to an 
end, the British attention apportioned to protecting this small, but crucial strategic 
holding paid off. They remained in control of the port for the interbellum period and at 
the beginning of the next war. 
The War of American Independence ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, 
in 1783. The British War with France and Spain ended with the Treaties of Versailles 
during the same year. Hostilities with the Netherlands, the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, 
ended during the following year. The results were disastrous for Britain. Like France two 
decades before, Britain lost most of a continent. British influence in North America was 
significantly reduced. However, Britain maintained influence in the Caribbean Sea and 
Canada. This influence set the stage for an interbellum period that staged the British 
Navy, commanded by many of the naval leaders of the wars to come, against a veritable 
flotilla of smugglers and illicit traders from the United States and other economic powers. 
The struggle to limit the smugglers in the West Indies gave the British 
commanders valuable experience they would use in the future. They learned how to 
operate during inshore operations as well as deep-sea patrols. Many of the commanders, 




complacency exhibited by their superior officers.31 The senior officers and British 
Governors in the West Indies had to perform a delicate balancing act between the 
enforcement of the unpopular trade laws, and the interests of the local British merchants 
and businesses who thrived on the cheap goods from the Americas instead of the more 
expensive British goods. 
Beyond the enforcement of the Navigation Acts in the Americas, Britain did not 
have many naval strategic concerns after the War of American Independence. The period 
included an extended period of demobilization of the British fleet resources. Much of the 
West Indies operations were handled by frigates and smaller unrated ships. However, 
demobilization did not lead to the deterioration of the British Navy. The Navy 
Comptroller, Admiral Charles Middleton (Lord Barham), enacted a successful campaign 
to prepare the navy for future needs by “reforming and extending dockyards, eliminating 
the grosser forms of corruption and inefficiency, building up stocks of naval store, 
ensuring that existing warships were regularly repaired or replaced, and supervising the 
entire construction programme.”32 These reforms placed the British navy in a strong 
position as tensions mounted on the continent after the beginning of the French 
Revolution. 
1793-1813 
The next chapter in British naval history came after the French revolutionary 
government declared war on Austria and Prussia, in 1792. Although Britain did not 
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immediately declare war on France, the possibility of war was real, and reasonably 
expected to occur. Britain watched the war developments on the continent with 
increasing concern. Once France invaded the Austrian Netherlands, the war between 
Britain and France was inevitable.  Britain could not allow France to have a position of 
strategic advantage in the Netherlands, where they could threaten the home island and 
dominate Baltic Sea trade. However, the British government still failed to act. The 
international diplomatic community thought the French action necessitated a strategic 
response by Britain, but it was the French who declared war on the British in 1793.33 
The British Navy immediately started the mobilization process. The British 
mobilization was quick and efficient, backed by the government and the British people 
who were outraged by the regicidal actions of the French revolution and the fear created 
by the French continental territorial gains. They saw the French revolution and the 
subsequent republican government as a radical threat to their form of monarchy 
government.    
Mutiny and internal political unrest plagued early French Republic naval 
operations. British naval victories and advantages came quick. First, a group of 
Republican rebels who disagreed with the conduct of the Jacobin government in Paris 
took control of Toulon in the south of France. The French Mediterranean Fleet was at 
anchor in the Toulon harbor at the time. The rebels conducted diplomatic discussions 
with Admiral Hood of the British Mediterranean Fleet to surrender the Toulon fleet to the 
British. During the summer of 1793, the Toulonese handed over the harbor and the 
                                                 




French fleet to the British.34 The British government was slow to reinforce the fortunate 
events in Toulon, and the British were soon forced to abandon the harbor and move their 
Mediterranean operations elsewhere. 
British naval victories dominated the remainder of the period of hostilities. Every 
significant fleet action until the end of the Napoleonic Wars was won by the British 
Navy. The domination was so complete that by 1806 the British reduced the French and 
Spanish Navies to a point where they did not have the naval strength to enter a fleet 
battle. 
First among these battles was the Glorious First of June. This battle was fought 
during late May to June 1st of 1794. Although the immediate result of the battle was a 
crushing victory by the British Navy, the victory was not so glorious as time passed and 
experts analyzed the results. There are two primary reasons the glory of the victory was 
questioned later; the condition it left the British Navy and the fact that a large grain 
convoy made it to France to resupply the country.35 
The condition of the British Navy after the battle was miserable. Not only were 
many of the ships severely damaged in the battle, but many of the crews were also left 
under-numbered due to battle casualties. To make conditions worse, many more British 
sailors became casualties as the French prisoners brought disease onto the British ships.36 
In the eyes of the French, the most important result of the Glorious First of June 
battle was the arrival of a large grain convoy from the Americas. The goal of the British 
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fleet had been to intercept this shipment; however, due to the determination and bravery 
of the French Navy, the British fleet was occupied with the battle and unable to stop the 
convoy from arriving in France. The grain provided by this convoy was a substantial 
windfall for the struggling Revolutionary government, which was struggling to maintain 
control while food supplies ran low. The government knew they would be unable to 
maintain control and order if they did not prove themselves able to secure food for the 
French people.37 
In 1797, there was another decisive fleet engagement, off the Cape of Saint 
Vincent in Portugal. This battle became known as the Battle of Cape St. Vincent and was 
fought between the British fleet commanded by Admiral Sir John Jervis against the 
Spanish fleet commanded by Don Jose de Cordoba y Ramos. Jervis’ mission was to 
prevent the Spanish fleet from joining the French fleet at Brest. Keeping the fleets 
isolated was a critical mission. The fear in Britain was the combined Franco-Spanish 
fleet, along with the Dutch fleet, would be able to facilitate an invasion of Britain.38 
Admiral Jervis, later Lord St. Vincent, rose to the occasion. He implemented an 
unorthodox fleet tactic: 
By carrying a press of sail, I was fortunate in getting in with the enemy's 
fleet at half-past eleven o’clock, before it had time to connect and form a regular 
order of battle. Such a moment was not to be lost; and, confident in the skill, 
valour, and discipline of the officers and men I had the happiness to command, 
and judging that the honour of His Majesty's arms, and the circumstances of the 
war in these seas, required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself 
justified in departing from the regular system; and, passing through their fleet, in 
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a line formed with the utmost celerity, tacked, and thereby separated one-third 
form the main body…39 
 
 Jervis’ tactic divided the Spanish fleet, decreasing their combat effectiveness 
tremendously. The tactic succeeded in bringing disorder and confusion to the Spanish. 
However, the Spanish had an opportunity to regain their cohesiveness and join back 
together through switching tacks and coming around behind the British. An aggressive 
and intuitive commodore in the British fleet, Horatio Nelson, anticipated the move and 
acted without orders. His daring move, to pull out of the line of battle and cut off the 
Spanish maneuver, continued the advantage for the British and led the way to the British 
victory.40 After the battle, Nelson’s close friend Cuthbert Collingwood would write him, 
“…you formed the plan of attack, we were only accessories to the Don’s ruin; for, had 
they got on the other tack, they would have been sooner joined, and the business would 
have been less complete.”41 
 After the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, the Spanish fleet was reluctant to put to sea. 
After losing the battle in such a disgraceful way at the advent of their entry into the war, 
they shied from experiencing another fleet encounter with the British. The Spanish 
reluctance relieved the challenges of British naval strategic conditions.42 Without the 
Spanish Navy to distract it, the British Navy was able to concentrate its forces on the 
French and Batavian navies. 
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 Later in 1797, at the Battle of Camperdown, Admiral Adam Duncan handily 
defeated the Dutch naval fleet. The battle lacked the strategic imperative many of the 
naval battles of the time held. There were no merchant fleets to defend or attack. There 
was no longer the danger of allied invasion of England or Ireland.43 The battle was 
motivated by Dutch political policy. The Dutch government wanted their fleet to head to 
sea to lure Duncan’s North Sea fleet to battle and cripple it. Another Dutch political 
motivation was the desire to assert its strategic foreign policy independent from the 
influence of France.44 
 The Dutch learned to regret their impatience for naval conflict with the British 
fleet. Duncan was able to intercept the Dutch fleet off the Dutch coast near the village of 
Camperdown. Duncan attacked the Dutch line of battle by sending two lines of ships 
perpendicular to the Dutch line; a tactic made famous by Lord Horatio Nelson at the 
Battle of Trafalgar eight years later. The Dutch fought valiantly, but were no match for 
the British fleet. The British captured eleven Dutch ships during the action.45 The Dutch 
navy was unable to recover from such a loss of ships and was all but mute for the 
remainder of the war. 
 The next notorious battle was The Battle of the Nile in 1798. This battle solidified 
the British dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and effectively ended the French 
expedition to Egypt and the Middle East. French forces in Egypt were left isolated with 
no easy way back to the European continent. The battle also happens to be Horatio 
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Nelson’s first fleet action as commander; the results foreshadowed his daring and 
brilliance as a fleet commander. 
 The battle occurred after Nelson’s long hunt for the French fleet in the 
Mediterranean. He used the available intelligence to determine the French headed South 
toward Egypt. Nelson arrived off the coast of the Nile River and started a search for the 
French fleet. The French were found anchored close to shore in Aboukir Bay. The French 
had positioned their anchored fleet in a way to defend against any attack from the sea. In 
the act of unpredictability and unrequited daring, Nelson ordered his ships into a line of 
battle. He ordered a portion of his fleet to form a line and sail in between the French fleet 
and the shore, a maneuver the French had not predicted. 
 The result of the battle was devastating for the French. Of the 13 ships of the line 
they had anchored in the bay, the British captured nine, and two more were destroyed. 
The flagship of the French commander, Vice-Admiral Brueyes d’Aigalliers, the L’Orient, 
exploded during the battle after its gunpowder magazine ignited. The battle began the 
public acknowledgment of the heroism of Nelson and celebration of his “Band of 
Brothers,” a group of captains serving under him in the battle. 
 British victory at the Nile led to British dominance in the Mediterranean. Just 
three months after the Battle of the Nile, the British recovered Minorca from the French. 
The capture of Minorca served as a symbol of a reversal of fortunes from the disgraceful 




nearly unmolested British trade, while French shipping trade was reduced to a hazardous 
business.46 
 The next significant battle of the French Revolutionary war was the Battle of 
Copenhagen. The British conflict with Denmark leading up to the battle had complicated 
roots. The prosperous trading nation of the Baltic Sea was engulfed in an international 
conflict because of events that took place on the small Mediterranean island of Malta. 
After the Battle of the Nile, the British forces acted with the approval of their Russian 
ally to reconquer Malta for the Order of the Knights of Saint John. The Russian leader, 
Tsar Paul, had been elected Grand Master of the order shortly after the French had 
conquered the island. 
 However, after the British captured Malta from the French, they decided not to 
hand it back to the order or Russia. The island included a deepwater port the British saw 
as too valuable a resource in the region.47 This decision ended the Russian alliance with 
Britain. Russia then led a Baltic coalition, including Denmark and Sweden, in an effort to 
usurp British trading restrictions and shipping inspections in the Baltic and North Seas. 
The coalition members were also required to close their ports to British trade. Denmark 
was reluctant to fulfill this measure, but the threat of Russian military coercion forced 
them to comply. Britain could not allow this measure to pass unanswered. A fleet 
commanded by Admiral Hyde Parker was sent to attack Copenhagen and force Denmark 
and Sweden to resume trade. 
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 Copenhagen was positioned at the gateway to the Baltic Sea and was a vital 
trading center. However, its approaches were challenging when the wind was westerly 
even for even a single ship. The problematic approach was magnified by the effort of 
maneuvering a fleet into the port in battle order. Consistent with his temperament and 
bravery, Lord Nelson volunteered to command the portion of the fleet that was appointed 
to enter the King’s Deep channel from the south and form a line of battle across from the 
anchored Danish ships.48 Admiral Parker and his division remained up the King’s Deep 
channel to the north and would be unable to join the battle due to the wind and current 
conditions. 
 The British division under Nelson’s command defeated the Danish naval forces, 
and in creative use of ruse de guerre by threatening to burn all the Danish ships with their 
men on board unless the Danish surrendered. The crown prince of Denmark immediately 
ordered a ceasefire to all his forces. 49 
 During the next year, the Republic of France and Great Britain signed the Treaty 
of Amiens; ending hostilities between the two empires. However, the peace did not last. 
The following year France and Britain were at war again. As in the previous war, Spain 
joined France against Britain, first in a secret alliance and later in an open declaration of 
war. This war, or more appropriately stated, series of wars, lasted until the defeat of 
Napoleon by the combined forces of Britain and Prussia at the Battle of Waterloo. 
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The final crucial naval fleet battle of the Napoleonic Wars was the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1805. This battle occurred off Cape Trafalgar on the Atlantic coast of Spain. 
The British fleet of twenty-seven ships of the line, commanded by Rear Admiral Nelson, 
attacked the combined allied fleet of France and Spain, consisting of thirty-three ships of 
the line.50 
Once again Nelson led the British forces of inferior numbers into a spectacular 
victory. Again, he used unorthodox tactics, as Duncan had used at Camperdown and 
Nelson had previously used at the Nile, to be unpredictable and to drive the enemy into 
confusion. At the end of the battle, the British had captured twenty-one allied ships and 
destroyed one.51 The glory of the victory proved to be bittersweet for Britain. Although 
the British fleet had struck a significant blow to the allied naval power and strategy, 
Britain suffered its own loss when it learned Lord Nelson was killed during the battle. 
Nelson’s heroic reputation had already become a national phenomenon, and the blow of 
his loss placed the nation into mourning. The nation’s feelings for Nelson were embodied 
in Vice Admiral Collingwood’s address to the fleet, as he assumed command at Nelson’s 
death: 
The ever-to-be-lamented death of Lord Viscount Nelson, Duke of Bronte, 
the Commander-in-Chief, who fell in the action of the 21st, in the arms of Victory, 
covered with glory –whose memory will be ever dear to the British Navy and the 
British Nation, whose zeal for the honour of his King and the interests of his 
country will be ever held up as a shining example for a British seaman- leaves to 
me a duty to return my thanks.52 
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After the Battle of Trafalgar, the French and Spanish navies were significantly 
weakened. The Spanish navy no longer offered a threat to Britain, but the French had a 
fleet in reserve at Brest. This fleet was able to make its way to sea when the British 
blockading force returned to England for much-needed rest and repair during the winter 
of 1805.53 Therefore, the threat of a French invasion of the British homeland remained for 
years after Trafalgar. The British government administration enacted reforms to build 
coastal defenses54 and bolster the naval resources available to defend the homeland in the 
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British Naval Leadership 
 Over the five decades from the time of Admiral Byng’s execution, to the death of 
Admiral Lord Nelson, there was a distinct transformation of British naval leadership. The 
transformation consisted of a change in the overall aggressiveness of British commanders 
and the acceptance of creativity and unorthodox tactics when they were used to defeat 
Britain’s enemies. 
 The naval leadership demonstrated between 1793 and 1813, exhibited a marked 
difference from the naval leadership demonstrated before 1763. Before 1763, and most 
notably in 1757, when Admiral Byng was executed because he failed to relieve the 
British forces on Minorca, British leaders exercised a balance between aggression and 
cautiousness. They were reluctant to extend themselves into battles where they could not 
follow the prescribed fleet action orders. These orders prescribed fleet actions where the 
fleet remained in a controlled and structure line of battle no matter what the conditions 
dictated.  
 Admiral Byng may not have been the only British naval officer to be cautious, but 
he has come to embody the antithesis to what later came to be expected of a naval officer 
in Vice-Admiral Nelson’s time. During April of 1956, when Byng sailed for the 
Mediterranean Sea, he was given orders to pick up garrison troops at Gibraltar and bring 
them to assist on Minorca. In May, Byng embarked from Gibraltar to relive the 




not take the garrison troops with him. He sent a letter to London explaining he did not 
take the troops because the operation was bound to fail. 55 
 Byng arrived off of Minorca on May 20th and found the British ground forces 
were still defending their position. Byng’s fleet attacked the French fleet commanded by 
Admiral La Galissoniére. However, the attack was handled clumsily, and only a few of 
the British ships were able to engage the French before Byng withdrew. Byng’s fleet was 
still very much intact and able to renew the attack. In fact, it was not even necessary for 
Byng to directly attack the French fleet again; just allowing his frigates to patrol the area 
and prevent supplies from being shipped to the French ground forces would have been a 
strategic victory. Instead, Byng completely withdrew his fleet and returned to Gibraltar.56 
 British naval officials and the British public were furious with Byng. Due to the 
disgrace perceived by the British people, the British government failed and was replaced 
by the ministry formed by William Pitt. The new government appeared to be fortuitous 
for Byng, as the Pitt-Grenville administration appeared to be a political ally. However, a 
series of accusations of intentional failure in the conflict off Minorca, and the poorly 
timed adulation from several French officials only led to more public criticism of Byng. 
Ultimately, he was convicted during a court-martial for “failing to do his utmost to take 
or destroy the enemy ships.”57 The subsequent execution of Byng did not settle the matter 
entirely. The general embarrassment among Navy officials, triggered by the public 
perception of systemic cowardice and incompetence within the Navy brought about an 
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urgency to make changes to address deficiencies and encourage an attitude of supremacy 
among British naval leaders. 
 Many British naval leaders understood a change in the fleet fighting instructions 
would address some of the deficiencies in fleet actions. There was a need for allowing 
more individual adaptation to conditions and the positive opportunities that sometimes 
present themselves during complex combat evolutions. The instructions also needed to 
allow for the development of a more aggressive officer corps. In response to the need for 
a change in the fighting instructions, a year after Byng’s execution, Admiral Edward 
Hawke altered the fighting instructions for his Western Squadron. He removed the 
requirement for ships in line of battle to engage enemy ships “in the Order the Admiral 
has prescribed,”58 and replaced it with, “as close as possible, and therefore on no account 
to fire until they shall be within pistol shot.”59 In the wake of Admiral Byng’s failure at 
Minorca, British leaders recognized more aggressive and bold actions were not only 
needed, but it was also necessary to spell them out in general orders. Hawke’s new 
tactical boldness was the legacy that he would start, and Nelson and his contemporaries 
would perfect nearly fifty years later.60 
 Over the next five decades, the British Navy had carried the lions share of the 
burden of defeating France and her allies, and the leadership of the navy reflected on its 
success. Overwhelmingly, these men recognized the difference in spirit exhibited by their 
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contemporary flag officers in comparison to earlier officers before the Seven Years’ War. 
The fighting spirit had changed. Long gone was the measured outcomes of predictable 
and cautious naval fleet actions. The success of the navy was recognized to be a product 
of relentless courage and unorthodox adaptation of a new breed of officers. 
 Moreover, the spirit of Nelson as a national hero and a perfect example of naval 
leadership carried on for decades after the Napoleonic wars. His reputation and success 
was an inspiration for the next generation of naval officers. His relentless courage, 
unmatched aggression, and high regard for the honor of the British nation formed the 
standard from which naval officers were measured. However, even with all the praise 
lauded on Nelson, and the unmatched historiographical material that had been produced 
on his account, he was not unique. Many of his contemporaries had the same vigor in 
action and exhibited courage comparable to Nelson. The set of military attributes in 
which Nelson has been given credit for was held by many of those who trained Nelson to 
be a naval officer, and by those that served with and under Nelson.  
 The following pages will explore the characteristics of British naval officers of 
the period, with an effort to understand how they developed into leaders, and how their 
leadership manifested to their subordinates and peers. To come to this understanding it is 
essential to analyze the social history of British naval officers, the leadership roles 
officers served, and the executive leadership styles represented within the group. 
Social History of Leaders 
  One of the most important considerations of the superiority of British naval 
officers over their adversaries is the how these officers’ careers developed. Was there a 




the British maritime communities that supplied the majority of the officers? To answer 
these questions, the career development of British naval officers must be examined. This 
examination must study the broad social history of British naval officers. The social 
history must consider factors such as upbringing, education, training, social class, wealth, 
personal characteristics, and the importance of professional merit within the patronage 
system. The important consideration when comparing British naval officers with officers 
from rival navies is whether there were differences in the social characteristics of the 
officers. Identifying social differences among the officers will allow for a comparison 
when other factors -such as gunnery, shipbuilding, tactics, and strategic advantage- are 
equal.  
 The origin of the British Navy's officers, where they came from, was critical to 
the Navy’s success. The geographic origin of the officers, as well as their family 
connections, had a significant impact on whether or not an aspiring officer would make it 
on board a ship to eventually rise to the level of a commissioned officer. Naturally, based 
on the proximity to the ocean and the major Navy ports, most young men and boys came 
from maritime communities and had family connections to either the navy or the civilian 
maritime shipping industry. However, there were exceptions to this rule. Many noble and 
landed families saw the navy as an opportunity for their second and subsequent sons to 
make a name for themselves and benefit financially from the prize money available 
during the extended periods of active war. In his work, A Social History of British Naval 
Officers, 1775-1815, scholar Evan Wilson points out how wealthy families recognized 
how crucial it was to expose their young men to the responsibilities and adventures of a 




came to choose this structured environment for this period of their children’s 
development over the traditional Grand Tour.61 
 Previously, during the first half of the eighteenth century, these families would 
have encouraged their young men to make a Grand Tour of Europe to satisfy the need for 
adventure and exposure to the world. However, during the period of this study, this 
popular tradition was discouraged. The Grand Tour was seen by English leaders and 
clergy to give a French influence to the British young men. A tour in these continental 
countries was believed to weaken their masculine Englishness.62 The Bishop of 
Worcester, Richard Hurd, wrote in his work, On the Use of Foreign Travel, “Let the arts 
of address and insinuation flourish in France. Without them, what merit can pretend to 
success, what talents, open the way to favour and distinction? But let a manlier character 
prevail here.”63 With these thoughts prevailing in England, these families would use any 
influence they had to attach their sons to the Navy, knowing they could quickly usher 
themselves into manhood through the glory of naval wartime operations. 
 These patriotic English families recognized the importance of attaching their 
young men to the Navy, which was seen as the primary protector of the island nation. 
Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the British Navy was known by the English 
people by the enduring term of “Wooden Walls,” safeguarding the country from invasion. 
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Most notably used in T. Augustine Arne’s work, Britain’s Best Bulwarks, a dramatic 
piece from the period: 
Thine oaks descending to the main, 
With floating forts shall stem the tides, 
Asserting Briton’s liquid reign, 
Where’er her thund’ring navy rides; 
Nor less to peaceful arts inclin’d, 
Where commerce opens all her stores, 
In social bands shall lead mankind, 
And join the sea-divided shores; 
Spread then thy sails where naval glory calls, 
Britain's best bulwarks are her wooden walls.64 
 
However, the navy was also an attractive prospect for many British families for 
another reason. Unlike the British army, where commissions were bought, and only 
wealthy families could dream of success, the Navy offered commissions without 
monetary consideration. Although money could help gain influence to speed up the 
process, it was not a necessity, and a young officer from meager beginnings could earn a 
commission or a fortune in the navy.65 
The majority of the commissioned officers in the British navy started their navy 
careers as young boys. They were entered into their respective ships’ books as young 
gentlemen and took on a role of authority and responsibility even though they were 
technically a rated seaman and not a commissioned officer. They lived in a quasi-
leadership role where they were expected to lead small groups of men, and act as a 
supervisor of mundane and repetitive labor. However, at the same time, these young boys 
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were expected to learn the fundamentals of seamanship and warfare from the 
commissioned officers, and even from the seamen they supervised. 
 These young gentlemen started their careers entirely dependant on the captain of 
the ships on which served. The captains brought these young gentlemen onboard the 
ships for various reasons. Many of the captains took on board sons of other naval 
officers, friends, or family members.66 Also, captains were approached by members of 
influential families looking for a berth for their young gentlemen. In these situations, the 
captains could make powerful political allies in a career that largely depended on political 
connections to receive valuable assignments and commands. 
 Although the captains that took these young gentlemen on board could greatly 
benefit from the favor they served to another, he was also limited to the number of boys 
he could take onto his ship. He would work to ensure the boys were worthy of 
appointment and would serve honorably. Many captains were stuck with less than 
desirable boys on their ships, sometimes lamenting their bad luck to have such a let down 
from their expectations, or regretting being talked into taking on a boy from a person he 
found it politically difficult to deny. Therefore, captains attempted to choose the young 
gentlemen when they could do so. They may be forced to take on a son of an influential 
political leader, but when they could make choices, they would attempt to take those 
young gentlemen that showed excellent prospects for becoming a commissioned officer. 
The entry of young boys into the navy with the prospect of one day gaining a 
commission is closely related to another aspect of the social history of the British Navy, 
                                                 




patronage. British naval officers assumed the role of patron to some of their young 
subordinates. The process of patronage within the navy served two purposes. First, it 
allowed for the training and advancement of young officers. These officers were 
encouraged and assisted by their patrons to learn all the essential knowledge needed in 
seamanship, navigation, and gunnery. Then as the young officer’s career advanced, the 
patron would use their position and political influence to acquire promotion and favorable 
assignments for their protégé. In turn, the patron would have a following of young 
officers whom he could trust and call on to perform various assignments or favors. 
 Patrons did not use their influence to help every young officer under their 
command or sphere of influence. The patron had to carefully choose whom they would 
use their political capital to assist through their naval career. If the young officer had no 
promise to become an effective leader, or had a personality vice, the patron did not want 
to risk their reputation by supporting the young officer. If the young officer turned out to 
be a disgrace or commit some act unbecoming of an officer, that stain of disgrace would 
touch the patron’s reputation. Many times patrons would assist young officers within 
their own family, or within a close friend’s family. Assistance from a patron occurred 
early in Horatio Nelson’s career as his uncle Captain Suckling used his influence to get 
Nelson command of the ship Albemarle.67 
 The ordinary system of patronage had a great deal of influence on the quality of 
officers in the officer corps. As young gentlemen and officers with less desirable traits 
were left without patrons and influence, those who had ability received patrons and 
                                                 




influence and had a better chance of promoting and receiving desirable assignments. 
Therefore, because the officers who had superior abilities had a patron, and a better 
chance of promoting, the overall quality of the officer corp remained high. 
 Patronage remained one of the most critical factors for the career prospects of 
young gentlemen entering the navy. Their favor among the naval leadership was usually 
not determined by their gentility at birth, but rather their gentility in behavior. In fact, in 
his book, A Social History of British Naval Officers, Wilson points out there was a 
minuscule difference in the percentage of naval officers of different social classes that 
reached the rank of Post Captain. Whether they came from middle-class families or the 
wealthy elite, roughly twenty percent of officers reached post rank.68 When it came to a 
successful naval career, what mattered more than claiming a landed estate was the 
capacity to behave like a gentleman. Rich and poor alike could succeed or fail to live up 
to this standard. Although those raised on a lower social scale had a distinct disadvantage 
due to their lack of exposure to examples of gentility while growing up, they could 
overcome this disadvantage and impress the commissioned officers of their ship with 
proper behavior and etiquette. Once an aspiring officer came on board his particular ship, 
he gained permission and access to walk the quarterdeck, and be treated as a gentleman.69 
 Wilson’s argument supporting an environment which depended less on one’s 
background, and more on one’s ability to ‘act the part’ of gentility, runs counter to the 
idea Lewis forwards in his book, A Social History of the Navy. Lewis held that the 
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“Interest” aspiring naval officers held, by way of connections to powerful and influential 
patrons, was what separated the elite officers from the rest.70 
 In support of his argument that social status had little to do with an aspiring 
officer’s success, Wilson’s argument is primarily based on the importance of merit for an 
officer’s success. He believes successful officers didn’t go along passively in their roles; 
instead they were active participants in the process of promoting themselves and 
attracting positive attention toward their abilities and ambition.71 Wilson gives two 
exceptional examples of meritious officers and how their actions benefitted their careers. 
 First, Wilson gives the example of Christopher Cole, who worked through the 
death of two subsequent patrons, to finally be made post-captain by a third patron. His 
abilities and determination to do his best impressed each of the patrons in turn. He did not 
come from a navy family or have powerful political connections, but he had the traits that 
his naval patrons wanted to encourage and develop.72 He was a self-made man in his 
naval career. 
 The second, and more profound, example Wilson gives is the career of John 
Perkins. Perkins was born into slavery in Jamaica. Just before the American War of 
Independence, he joined the British Navy as a pilot at the Jamaica station. Perkins so 
impressed the naval officers on the Jamaica station with his knowledge of the area, and 
his ability, that he was given command of a schooner. For two years, during his command 
of the schooner, he captured many prizes and conducted reconnaissance missions and 
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intelligence gathering for Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In 1781, Parker rewarded 
Perkins with a lieutenant’s commission. After a year, Admiral George Brydges attempted 
to promote Perkins to the rank of commander. However, the Admiralty refused to 
confirm the promotion. Perkins continued to serve as a lieutenant after the war. When 
war with France started, he continued his intelligence-gathering efforts in the Caribbean. 
In 1797 he was again promoted to commander, and this time the Admiralty confirmed his 
promotion. In 1800 Perkins was made a post Captain. He continued to serve in the West 
Indies for another four years before poor health forced him to retire.73 
 Perkins career is a strong example of Wilson’s argument for the following reason. 
The commanding admirals at the Jamaica station were well aware of the serious 
implications of their efforts to raise Perkins to command within the navy. The slave-
owning planter society of Jamaica would not accept a black man having command over 
whites. Even more shocking to the white planters was the idea of a black man having the 
right to discipline whites according to the Navy's articles or war, which allowed Perkins 
to order the flogging of white sailors. However, the most critical point to take away from 
Perkins’ career in the Caribbean was the support he had from the local admirals even 
though their support for him went against the powerful white planters society in the 
islands. The Admirals recognized his ability as a naval officer and regarded that 
characteristic over the interests of the locals. Regardless of the social taboos, and due to 
the merit he deserved, he was promoted to commander twice and then promoted to post-
captain.74 
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 The reverse is also true; if an officer showed a lack of ability or tenacity, he gave 
a negative impression, and his career consequently suffered. Patrons were much less 
likely to advance or place trust in a subordinate that repeatedly showed an inability to live 
up to the strict standards of a navy officer. This tendency came from the very top of 
leadership within the navy and extended down to the captains and commanders when 
they were making decisions on whether or not to bring a young gentleman on board. The 
importance of merit shines through at this point. Even if a young gentleman was from a 
noble and powerful family, officers were reluctant to advance those who did not show 
promise and merit. Even a paragon of the navy, Lord St. Vincent, once wrote of how he 
rejected the advancement of an ‘honorable’ subordinate: 
“He…like the rest of the Aristocracy, thinks he has from that circumstance a right 
to promotion in prejudice to men of better services and superior merit, which I 
never will submit to. Having refused the Prince of Wales, Duke of Clarence, Duke 
of Kent, and Duke of Cumberland, you will not be surprized[sic] that I repeat the 
impossibility of departing from any principle which would let in such inundation 
upon me as would tend to complete the ruin of the Navy.”75 
 
Lord St. Vincent saw the importance of merit over political influence when it came to the 
success of the navy, and he advanced promotions based on that principle. St. Vincent was 
not alone. “On the whole the captains and admirals, whose own professional credit was at 
stake, were good at insulating officers’ careers from outside interference; meaning that 
they themselves acted as a filter, receiving recommendations from political and personal 
connections, but adopting only those candidates whose abilities justified their 
endorsement and strengthened their professional authority.”76 
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 Whether Lewis’ idea of the need for the powerful ‘Interest’ held by the highest 
social classes was the key to promotion, or it was Wilson’s assertion of merit as the chief 
catalyst for an officer’s career, we will probably never definitively know. However, 
nobody can disagree that British naval officers were highly skilled and knowledgeable 
seamen. These officers, most of who spent a good portion of their childhood at sea, were 
trained in every nautical and navigational skill on board their respective ships. They spent 
at least six years learning their trade before they could take the exam which was their 
gateway to an officer’s commission. During those six years, they learned knots, splicing 
rope, the principles of sailing, gunnery, navigation, and basic leadership skills. When 
compared to officers of other navies of the world, British officers had the background and 
development as a seaman first, and an officer second. Starting their careers as seaman 
gave them a distinct advantage over naval officers of other countries because they had an 
intimate knowledge of all aspects of seamanship and ship handling. They had a greater 
understanding of the impact of their orders on their men and their ships. 
 The origins and the entry of young gentlemen into the navy, the practice of 
patronage to promote worthy aspiring officers, and the dominance of the British officer 
training program at sea explain how British officers were able to develop a distinct 
advantage over the officers of other navies. Subsequently, these officers’ professional 
pride which came along with their ability multiplied their success by giving them 
deserved confidence in their ability. In order to understand how the development of the 
British officers gave them distinct attributes and advantages, it is crucial to review the 




Navy. The contrast between the development of the two nations’ officers speaks volumes 
to the real life preparation British officers had at the time of their commissioning.  
 While British ‘young gentlemen’ were learning their skills on board a ship, 
French officers in training received their education in naval academies on shore. The 
academies were open to nobles under the age of sixteen and taught fundamental skills of 
writing, drawing, mathematics, fortifications, hydrography, geometry, seamanship, 
navigation, and naval warfare. However, since the French were primarily trained these 
skills on land, and aspiring British officers learned them during practical application at 
sea, the British trainees had critical experience dealing with crisis management and 
learned to handle life and death situations first hand.77  
 Due to the difference in officer preparation between the two nations’ navies, a 
distinct difference formed between the relationship between British officers and their 
seamen, and French officers and their seamen. British officers, who developed an equal 
appreciation for seamanship and served as midshipmen in the lower decks of their ships 
during their training, could empathize with the plight of their seamen. They were 
accustomed to applying their knowledge of seamanship during their service in a practical 
manner. The French officers, on the other hand, because they received a primarily 
theoretical education, were detached from the practical application of their knowledge. In 
turn, they were detached from their sailors that performed those skills.78 A contemporary 
observer, Admiral Graham Moore, stated the following of French officers: 
[V]ery few of the French navy officers of the old regime knew anything at all 
about [seamenship]. They affected indeed to despise it, which men often wish to 
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do when they find those whom they deem their inferiors more perfect in an art 
than themselves. The superior skill, however, in practical seamenship is one of the 
causes of the unrivalled eminence which the British navy has attained, and I 
should be very sorry to sea any more relaxation in the strictness of our young 
Midshipmen’s time of probation.79 
 
 In 1786, the French established some reforms for officer recruitment and training. 
Although much of the initial technical training was still provided in naval academies, 
after commissioning examinations, there was a new emphasis on practical training at 
sea.80 However, these reforms came late in the period preceding the French Revolution. 
During the revolution and the ensuing purge of aristocratic officers from the Navy, the 
French were again left with an inexperienced officer corps that had little practical 
application of their theoretical knowledge, or experience. The British officers and navy 
took advantage of their superiority in leadership and seamanship, and the lack of effective 
reform within the French Navy, throughout the next two decades.81 
 There is another important comparison that must be made in order to understand 
how the training and development of a British naval officer contributed to their 
superiority. This comparison must be made to rule out the idea that all branches of the 
British military were equal in their development of officers and contribution to the 
various war campaigns fought throughout the period. Therefore, the following pages will 
outline the development of the officers within the British Army. 
From the middle of the eighteenth century to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, 
Britain was almost continuously in a state of war. The British navy became thoroughly 
                                                 
79 Tom Wareham, Frigate Commander (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2004), 214. 
80 Cormack, Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794, 43. 




adept at mobilizing and engaging in combat operations throughout the period. However, 
the navy was not alone; the British Army was also engaged in continuous conflict during 
the period. The British army fought in the Seven Years War, the American Revolution, 
the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and other smaller conflicts. However, the 
results were not the same for the Navy and the Army. The Navy was victorious in nearly 
every fleet battle they engaged in, while the army had mixed results. In order to 
determine the reason for the discrepancy in results achieved by the British Navy and the 
British Army, historians have studied these outcomes for two centuries. After all the 
study on the subject, there is no clear consensus about why the two branches of the 
British military had such varying results. 
 Although there are many reasons posited by scholars for the difference in results 
among the British military forces, there is one primary reason that touched on the nature 
of leadership within the respective branches of the British military. This reason is the 
structure of advancement of officers within the branches, an important aspect of the 
development of leaders. As briefly mentioned earlier in this study, there was a distinct 
difference in the manner in which officers in the navy and the army were promoted. The 
army had a system of promotion focused on the purchase of officer commissions, while 
navy promotions were based on merit and the political art of patronage. 
 The army’s commission payment system focused on a set amount of cash 
payment the candidate would pay in order to achieve the next rank. The payment was a 
bond payment in a trust held by the army in order to guarantee the officer acts with 
appropriate demeanor, courage, and obedience. Among the army there were several 




army as a whole. The intention of this study is not to make a complete evaluation of 
commission purchase system within the British army of the period, but rather to point out 
some of the principles that caused naval officers to have distinct advantages in experience 
and ability within their military branch, over army officers. Nothing in this study will 
suggest there were not highly effective officers within the army; however, it will discuss 
the implications of the commission purchase system of the army as opposed to the merit 
and patronage system of the navy. 
 The primary weakness of the commission purchase system was the fact that 
unproven and inexperienced officers who had vast financial resources, usually a product 
of family connections, could rise through the ranks of a regiment without experiencing 
combat or other challenges that developed his knowledge or leadership skills. Money, 
and sometimes tenure, was all that was required. These purchases sometimes rose less 
experienced men to higher ranks then the experienced men who did not have the financial 
ability. A glaring example of this problem is highlighted by Field Marshal Colin 
Campbell, Lord Clyde, and his testimony before the army’s Purchase Commission: 
There was an officer in the 55th regiment, who had been promoted for 
service in the field, and had obtained his brevet majority. He led the 
assault at Ching-kiang-foo; and though he became brevet lieutenant-
colonel, and was in command of the 55th regiment in the field, in the 
presence of the enemy, a young captain, who had just come out, purchased 
over his head, and took command of the regiment, and he was obliged to 
descend to the command of a company. The poor fellow was killed in 
leading his company against the Redan – his name was Lieutenant-
Colonel Cuddy. The young officer was very young; and in this case a man 
of experience, who was fitted for his position for that particular occasion, 
and had proved himself a bold and intrepid soldier, was superseded in his 
command by one who, I dare say, was equally so, but did not possess his 
experience; nor could that young man have commanded the confidence of 




frequently in the field with them, and having distinguished himself as a 
soldier.82 
 
 Lord Clyde’s testimony sums up the argument against the purchased commission 
system and points out the weaknesses in relation to combat effectiveness. He includes an 
important detail that is even more damning to the system; the fact that Cuddy’s authority 
and leadership were superseded “in the presence of the enemy.” Although the testimony 
does not state how often something like this has occurred, it is clear to anyone with a 
sense of leadership, the act of changing leadership as two forces line up for battle, is 
bound to have adverse effects on morale. Also, based on Lord Clyde’s testimony, the 
soldiers in the regiment had come to respect Cuddy based on his experience and bravery 
in the past. This advantage was discarded for a young, inexperienced captain who had not 
earned the respect of the men yet. This type of promotion, whether in the presence of the 
enemy or not, reduced the amount of experience and battle proven boldness at the higher 
ranks of the British army. There is no doubt this practice took a negative toll on the 
success of the army. 
 Another fault of the purchased commission system was the prevalence of officers 
searching out commissions to purchase in other regiments. If there were no open spots for 
promotion in their regiment, they would look elsewhere to promote to the rank they 
desired. The problem with this aspect of the system is evident from a leadership point of 
view. These officers would be leaving the soldiers and other officers they knew well and 
the internal policies of the regiment they belonged to and switch to a new regiment with 
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new superiors, peers, and subordinates. This change and lack of the knowledge or 
relationships within the new regiment could harm the officer’s ability to lead. Also, the 
officer would not have earned the respect of the soldiers in his new unit, which would 
have a profound effect on morale and the soldiers’ willingness to follow the new 
officer.83 
 Finally, the commissioned officers in the navy were, in general, more competent 
in their field because they were required to demonstrate knowledge, and had a required 
period of time at sea before they could be commissioned. The ordinary process for 
promotion was to demonstrate knowledge through a rigorous testing process before a 
board of senior officers before they qualified for promotion.84 In the army there was no 
such requirement. The army did not require any prerequisite knowledge, nor did it offer 
training to gain the knowledge, to gain a commission.85 
 As stated above, the sale of commissions in the British army is not the only 
difference between the army and the navy or the only factor which caused the 
discrepancy between the overall success of the army and the navy. However, this study is 
focused on leadership and the sale of commissions within the army profoundly affected 
leadership. It raised up undeserving men without experience, or knowledge of their 
duties, merely because they had means of money. The navy did not use this practice, and 
therefore, its officer corps was comprised of highly knowledgeable and experienced 
seamen, and for the most part, tested and bold warriors who had proven themselves in 
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combat. In the following pages, this confidence will be explored as the different 
professional leadership roles of British officers are studied. 
Leadership Roles 
 British naval officers had to fulfill many different roles throughout their careers. 
However, some primary roles were essential to maximize the effectiveness of the British 
Navy. Some of these roles were official, commanding a warship and diplomacy with 
other nations, and some of these roles were unofficial, being a patron to younger officers 
and acting as a mentor toward all subordinates. The ability an officer had in each of these 
roles helped determine how successful he would be as an officer. In addition to the ability 
in which they performed these roles, the number of roles an officer could successfully 
perform allowed him to be more efficient and valuable to the navy. Some officers could 
perform all these primary roles, and some could only perform a few. 
Combat Commander 
 One of the primary roles of a naval officer was their ability to command a ship in 
battle. The skill required to perform this role did not only consist of remaining calm 
under fire while in great danger, but it also required much more. Naval officers also 
needed to consider tactical navigation, seamanship, and the morale of their sailors. All of 
these aspects combined allowed for success as a combat commander. There is little 
question the British Navy produced some of the most effective combat officers in the 
world.  
 There were several reasons why the British officers excelled as combat 
commanders. First, they saw themselves as the protectors of Britain. The idea that a naval 




nation, and it was a common theme among the personal identification of British officers. 
Nelson once wrote to the new government ministry that he “protect[s] all from French 
rapacity.”86 However, the persona of the protector of Britain was not limited to the British 
officers’ image of themselves. The British public and even international dignitaries 
looked upon British officers in a similar way. As the navy was an extension of British 
foreign policy, dignitaries around the world from countries who were friendly to Britain, 
saw the navy and her officers as protectors. When the Queen of Naples writes to 
Collingwood after learning of the death of Nelson, she emplores, “I count that you will 
do for us that which was done by the respectable Milord Nelson, our friend, protector, 
and defender.”87  
 British officers took the role as protectors of Britain seriously. This role provided 
the impetus for unmatched bravery on the part of the British officers. They looked upon 
themselves as the only thing keeping their families and their way of life safe. The notion 
of being the only thing between the enemy and Britain prompted them to willingly put 
themselves in extreme danger, or up against overwhelming odds. Other nations’ navies 
did not have this unique characteristic. Those nations had land borders with other 
countries and faced the possibility of invasion over land or sea, so their navies did not 
rise to the same level of importance to their governments. 
 The second reason British officers were excellent combat commanders was they 
maintained a very high level of expectation for the skill and discipline of the men under 
their command. They expected the very best at all times. This high level of expectation 
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usually resulted in efficient and professional subordinate officers and skilled and highly 
trained seaman. 
 The combination of skillful British seamen and the disciplined order of a British 
ship proved to be the match of any equally sized naval ship of any nation. Over the period 
of this study, the confidence of the British officers and sailors only increased their 
combat effectiveness. They began to feel invincible, and this led to more daring and 
unpredictable tactics. In turn, the enemies of the British were even more confounded and 
overwhelmed. These attributes of skill and the environment of discipline that allowed for 
the increased combat effectiveness of the British navy was a direct result of the highly 
developed professionalism of the British officers. The advantages caused by this 
increased combat effectiveness allowed the British navy to completely dominate the 
oceans by the end of the Napoleonic Wars. 
Diplomat 
 There were times when British naval officers had to serve as diplomatic agents. 
There were times when detached frigate captains could fill this role. However, the vast 
majority of diplomatic duties carried out by naval officers was completed by flag officers, 
and most likely the commander-in-chief of a fleet. 
 One of most significant examples of diplomatic action taken by a British naval 
officer was at Toulon, on the southern coast of France, shortly after the outbreak of the 
French Revolution. As Admiral Samuel Hood’s fleet blockaded the port, French royalists 
arranged to meet with him. After conferring with representatives from Marseille and 




If a candid and explicit declaration, in favour of Monarchy, is made at 
Toulon and Marseilles, and the standard of royalty is hoisted, the ships in 
the harbor dismantled, and the port and forts provisionally at my 
disposition, so as to allow the egress and regress with safety; the people 
of Provence shall have all the assistance, and support, his Britannic 
Majesty’s fleet under my command can give; and not an atom of private 
property of any individual shall be touched, but protected: having no 
other view than that of restoring peace to a great nation upon just, liberal, 
and honourable terms. 
This must be the ground-work of the Treaty; and whenever peace takes 
place, which I hope and trust will be soon, the port, with all the ships in 
the harbor, and forts of Toulon, shall be restored to France, with the 
stores of every kind, agreeable to the schedule that may be delivered.88 
 
Hood did not have time to send a message back to the Admiralty and wait for a 
response and orders. A Republic army was already headed south toward Provence to 
crush the royalist rebellion. He recognized the importance of the opportunity that had 
been laid before him, and he knew he could not delay. He immediately sent urgent 
requests for ground troops from the British allies at Turin and Naples. He recognized he 
would be unable to defend Toulon without them.89 
The occupation of Toulon was a momentous event for the British. It placed the 
French Mediterranean fleet into the hands of the British and hampered the strategic 
operations within the region for years. French military plans against Spain and Naples 
had to be reevaluated and canceled.90 The diplomatic proceedings undertaken by Hood 
secured more than he could have ever accomplished militarily. The effort of attacking the 
French fleet in the well-fortified harbor of Toulon would have been disastrous for the 
fleet. All naval opinion of the time counted it as nearly impossible. The effect of such a 
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success was expressed by Nelson in a letter to his wife, “What an event this has been for 
Lord Hood. Such a one as History cannot produce an equal. That the strongest place in 
Europe and 22 sail-of-the-line &c. should be given up without firing a shot. It is not to be 
credited.”91 
Acts of diplomacy were often necessary due to the broad area of influence of the 
British Navy. In many parts of the world, the British naval officer may be the only 
representative of the British government; and they had to be prepared at all times to make 
diplomatic entreaties with global strategic concerns in mind. 
Leadership Styles 
Another distinct characteristic of a leader is their leadership style. Leadership 
styles have a profound impact on the relationship between a leader and his subordinates. 
In the British navy, the tone of the interaction between the ship's sailors with their 
officers was set by the leadership style of the captain of the ship; and to a lesser extent, 
the leadership styles among the rest of the officers on the ship. The tone could be 
anywhere on a range of cold and impersonal on one end, to warm and friendly on the 
other end. 
Undoubtedly, the leadership style of individual British naval officers was a 
product of their personality, upbringing, training, and professional experience. These 
factors are well recognized in modern military leadership studies. However, in the late 
18th century there was a more rudimentary understanding of leadership styles and how 
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they affected leadership and ship efficiency. Leadership abilities at that time were more 
closely linked to how capable the fighting unit was in battle. How the leader was able to 
accomplish the goal or his relationship with his subordinates, was seen as more or less an 
insignificant factor. During the period of this study, results were the only considerations, 
not the means to achieve them. Nevertheless, distinct differences in leadership styles 
among British naval officers of the period can be observed and analyzed. 
Today, modern western military leaders recognize and identify distinct 
differences in leadership styles. They recognize the importance of identifying the 
difference between leadership styles, and how to train leaders to alter, or develop, their 
leadership style to build a more cohesive fighting unit. Such a complete understanding of 
leadership styles was not accessible to the British naval leaders of the period of this 
study. This is not to say the leaders of the period lacked the ability to recognize 
leadership styles. They recognized the differences in leaders, but they lacked the formal 
study of leadership styles which is accessible to modern military leaders. Late eighteenth-
century British naval leaders could easily differentiate between a tyrannical leader and a 
disinterested leader who delegated all responsibility to others. However, their 
understanding of leadership, as mentioned above, was more centered on the results of the 
leadership, not the means of achieving the results. So, successful leaders in combat and 
navigation were placed on a pedestal, not for the way they achieved their greatness, but 
because of the success itself. Therefore the individual leadership style of the leader was 




As a result of the extensive scholarship which has been performed on British 
naval leaders of our period of study, it has become possible to see a clear vision of the 
leadership style of a significant number of these leaders. Some of the brightest examples 
of leadership styles studied by modern military theorists are the British naval leaders of 
the period of this study. These leaders are examined because they represent a group of 
military leaders who contributed to a force of dominance in the world of their time, and 
appeared to have distinct advantages over their enemies and contemporaries. Therefore, 
modern military and leadership scholars study these leaders to identify their leadership 
styles, and how those styles affected combat effectiveness, morale, and strategic 
awareness. 
The three most common and most broadly recognized leadership styles are 
authoritarian leadership, laissez-faire leadership, and visionary leadership. The first two 
have a direct impact on the operational interaction between a leader and a subordinate, 
while the visionary style is much more of an abstraction; more related to overall strategic 
missions and personal inspiration rather than everyday interactions and tactical 
operations. These leadership styles are accepted by a majority of scholars in the field of 
sociology and leadership, as well as by military leaders and military training programs. 
These styles will be examined in light of the leadership of British naval officers from the 
period of this study. Some of the important outcomes which are critical to examine are; 
how the leadership style inspired sailors, how the leadership style accomplished the goals 
of the leader and the navy, and whether or not the leadership style contributed a positive 




The first leadership style to be examined is authoritarian leadership. This style is 
most commonly associated with the popular image of a British naval officer of the 
period. These leaders are domineering and appear to be distant and aloof from their 
subordinates. This description of leadership can easily be seen in the British naval 
captains who regularly flogged sailors for any offenses or those captains who believed 
personal relationships with their subordinates would create weakness and compromise to 
their command.  
However, it was not necessary for a captain to be a “flogging captain,” or an 
impersonal tyrant, to be associated with an authoritarian leadership style. Merely being an 
officer in the British navy would necessitate the need to take an authoritative leadership 
role at times. The control mechanism on British ships was the authority of the officers 
and the submission of the sailors. Even the most charismatic officers had instances in 
their careers where they found it necessary to extend the use of corporal punishment to 
effect a goal. The most severe, and for some officers, the most common punishment to 
assert authority over the ship’s crew was flogging. Therefore, since all naval officers had 
to exert authoritarian leadership qualities at times to complete their duties of command, it 
is essential in this section to focus on those officers who exhibited authoritarian 
leadership most of the time. 
Fortunately for this study, there are several contemporary accounts of 
authoritarian leadership. The following two examples are written by sailors who 




warning to the reader to beware if they are ever placed under the command of a leader of 
this type. 
In his book, Thirty Years from Home, Or a Voice from the Main Deck, Samuel 
Leech, a man who served as a sailor on a British ship in 1812, gives an explicit 
representation of the definitive authoritative leadership: 
The captain was excessively proud; even his officers scarcely dared walk the 
quarter deck on the same side with him. He never allowed himself to be addressed 
but by his title of “my Lord.” Should a sailor, through design or forgetfulness, 
reply to a command, “Yes, sir,” the lordly man would look at him with a glance 
full of dignity, and sternly reply, “What, sir?” This, of course, would put the 
offender in mind to correct himself by saying, “Yes, my Lord.” Judge them of his 
surprise, indignation, nay, of his lordly horror, when the poor drunken Bob 
Hammond called him “Billy, my boy!” Doubtless is stirred up his nobility within 
him, for, with a voice of thunder, he exclaimed, “Put this man in irons!” It was 
done.92 
 
Likewise, in an account by William Richardson, in his book, A Mariner of England, the 
authoritative leadership of British officers is again displayed: 
I was obliged to be very cautious in this business, for our captain began now to 
show in his proper colours, and would flog a man as soon as look at him, and 
assumed as much consequence as if he had been captain of a line-of-battleship: all 
we four mates had to attend him with hats off at the gangway in going out or 
coming in to the ship; he flogged a good seaman for only losing an oar out of the 
boat, and the fellow soon after died.93 
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 These passages give us an insight into the primary motivation for the sailors under 
the command of this type of leader. That motivation was fear. Fear of punishment. 
Although there may also have also been an air of respect for the leader, especially if the 
leader was proven to be successful in combat operations, the authoritarian leader needed 
the fear of punishment to maintain control and discipline on his ship.  
 Therefore, the authoritarian leadership style did not produce results originating 
from the systematic inspiration of the sailors to achieve greatness, but instead forced 
them to perform their duties to avoid punishment under a cloud of fear. This is not to say 
ships under this type of leadership lacked combat effectiveness. Some of these ships were 
the most disciplined and organized ships in the navy. However, ships under this 
leadership style were more likely to lack the other two leadership outcomes that are 
important for total effectiveness; the inspiration of the sailors and the beneficial increase 
of morale. 
Authoritarian leadership stands in stark contrast to laissez-faire leadership. In the 
culture of the British navy of the time, this leadership style was evidenced in a minority 
of officers. However, it did exist, and it is essential to see how this leadership style 
contributed to the navy. At first glance, most would conjecture that laissez-faire 
leadership would be an ineffective leadership style for a ship during a war. The idea of a 
leader who gives his subordinates the freedom to perform their duties with little or no 
interference strikes most as irresponsible or disengaged. It is not the idea most hold about 




What is not immediately apparent to many studying leadership is laissez-faire 
leadership can be an important leadership style for the development of subordinates and 
the maintenance of morale. As laissez-faire leaders entrust their subordinates to perform 
their duties with little or no supervision, those subordinates learn vital lessons from their 
assignments and develop their skills. The satisfaction of personal development in this 
way increases the morale and the individual ability of the subordinates. 
Allowing subordinates to take a risk and succeed, as well as fail, helps train 
subordinates to perform their duties better. It gives the subordinates practical leadership 
abilities that cannot be experienced in any other manner. Allowing success through risk-
taking raises the level of experience and competence for the subordinates and develops 
the next generation of officers. Subordinate officers who are entrusted with important 
leadership duties and advanced responsibilities also learn to take pride in their 
accomplishments. This pride of accomplishment, in turn, increases the young leader’s 
confidence to perform at a higher level and become a competent leader as well. 
Researching British naval officers of the period who possessed laissez-faire 
leadership style is a challenge. The vast majority of officers of the period did not see this 
leadership style as a viable approach. Naval officers were expected to be active leaders; 
the laissez-faire style would have been an anomaly. Also, unless leaders of this period 
who held this leadership style were successful in every aspect of their leadership, they 
would most likely be labeled as fearful, timid, or shy. Even though there were very few 
prominent officers of the period that portrayed this leadership style, there is one that 




Starting in 1793, when England entered the French Revolutionary Wars, Vice 
Admiral Hotham served as second in command to the commander-in-chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Samuel Hood. Hotham was with Hood during the siege of 
Toulon and British operations in Corsica. When Hood was recalled to England in 1794, 
Hotham took over the command of the Mediterranean Fleet. His leadership could be 
described as laissez-faire, as well as ineffective. He appeared to lack the aggressive and 
decisive leadership his patron Hood possessed. Leadership was not a characteristic passed 
down from the senior to the junior admiral. 
Two incidents highlight the ineffectiveness of Hotham’s command. During March 
1794, Hotham pursued the French Toulon Fleet off Cape Noli, near Genoa. Captain 
Nelson was commanding the leading ship, Agamemnon. Because his ships were worn-out 
and undermanned and so far from a friendly base, Hotham settled on the capture of two 
ships and allowed the rest of the French fleet to escape. Predictably, Nelson was 
disappointed, “Admiral Hotham seems to have given the business up and thinks we have 
done enough, whilst Goodall and myself think we have done nothing in comparison to 
what we might.”94 Another incident occurred during July. There was a partial fleet 
engagement, and the French fled. The British fleet pursued the French, but Hotham called 
off the pursuit when the French neared the coast. After hearing of the halt of the pursuit, 
Hotham’s second in command, Vice Admiral Goodall, “is described as kicking his hat 
about the deck in a frenzy of rage when he was called off.”95 Reflecting on the same 
                                                 
94 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 433. 




orders to halt the pursuit, Nelson wrote, “Had Lord Hood been here he never would have 
called us out of action but Hotham leaves nothing to chance.”96 
Although Hotham’s leadership style can be argued to be cautious, not laissez-
faire; his leadership lacked the usual aggressiveness and confidence common among the 
average authoritarian leader, and it lacked the critical trait of inspiration common with 
visionary leaders. 
Another example of laissez-faire leadership is described in Tom Wareham’s book, 
The Star Captains. In his chapter on command styles among British naval frigate 
captains, Wareham discusses the differences between captains that had a reputation of 
conducting a large amount of punishment on their ships and those captains that tended to 
have little punishment on their ships. His research consisted of an analysis of the ships 
logs, with a focus on punishment and morale among the crews. 
Through his analysis, Wareham points out a particular frigate captain that was 
highly successful and had very little punishment on his ship, Captain James Newman. 
Punishments were so rare on Newman’s ship, the Mermaid, that there were no 
punishments recorded on the ship’s logs form April of 1797 to July 1798, nearly fourteen 
months.97 Although it is not conclusive whether Captain Newman’s lack of punishment 
was because his crew was so well behaved, this would most likely not be the case as no 
other British naval ship came close to the miniscule amount of punishment on board the 
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Mermaid, or because Newman was able to achieve a rare success using laissez-faire 
leadership. 
 The final leadership style is the visionary leader. Visionary leadership had less to 
do with the everyday and ordinary duties of a fighting ship, but more to do with the 
inspiration of men, and a vision toward the development of the ship’s company into an 
integral part of the overall mission of the navy. Due to the amount of research conducted 
on the leadership of Lord Nelson, and the clear indications that he was a visionary leader 
to his subordinates and peers, a discussion about visionary leadership cannot veer far 
from Nelson. Naval researchers, land force military researchers, and business leadership 
researchers all look to Nelson’s leadership for clues to the most effective way to lead an 
organization of any size. 
 Modern leadership researchers recognize Nelson’s ability to inspire subordinates 
to reach the heights of his vision and victory at all costs. The researchers attribute 
Nelson’s success to his ability to lead without making the means to success to be his 
actions, but to the collective actions of his ship’s crew.98 The results of Nelson’s 
leadership ability is summarized in the following: 
Lord Nelson is just one example of an individual from that era who could 
lead a band of rough-and-ready seamen, many of whom were outright 
criminals, unite them into a formidable fighting force, inspire them to die 
for a cause remote to many of them, and, through the force of his 
personality, bring about victory.99 
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Visionary leadership primarily involves the leader inspiring his subordinates to 
exceed expectations and performing extraordinary acts of heroism and courage in the face 
of overwhelming forces. These leaders “inspire others to move beyond their self-interests 
to what is best for the group or organization.”100 Many of these visionary leaders in the 
British Navy used different motivations to encourage their men to work as a more 
effective fighting unit. Among these motivations were the promise of prize money, the 
notorious British hatred of the French, religious differences between Protestant England 
and her Catholic enemies, and a healthy development of unit esprit de corps.  
However, these visionary leaders moved beyond the diverse motivations of their 
ships’ crews. They were able to transform the different motivations of all the crew 
members into a cohesive fighting unit that took on a mystique of greatness. This 
mystique of greatness was not the sum of all the motivations of the crew put together, but 
something higher. A unit could rise out of obscurity and become the essence of the 
British imperial military power. To create this mystique, these leaders allowed and 
encouraged their crews to believe they were the last great hope for Britain; and this belief 
stirred up the courage, determination, and hardiness exhibited by the crews onboard ships 
and within fleets led by these leaders. These crews and fleets, under these visionary 
British naval leaders, became some of the most significant fighting forces ever known in 
military history. 
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The list of leadership styles above is not exhaustive. They represent the most 
common leadership styles among the British naval leaders of the time. Of course, many 
of the leaders of the period would have possessed varying degrees of crossover between 
different styles. Throughout their careers they may have recognized situations where 
altering their primary leadership style may have produced different and better results. 
However, in general, it is easy to assign one of these leadership styles to the most 
prominent Naval leaders of the period. 
There were British naval leaders of all leadership styles that were successful and 
contributed significantly to the success of the British Navy during this critical period of 
history. Likewise, there were naval leaders with these same leadership styles that were 
unsuccessful and made a minimal contribution to the overall success of the British Navy. 
Where did the difference arise? The difference arose out of the bold acceptance of a new 
culture within the naval command. A culture that was born with the execution of Admiral 
Byng put into action by Admiral Hawke and perfected by Vice-Admiral Nelson. This 
new culture is exhibited through the great battles of the period and in the highlights of the 
careers of several of these naval officers. The tenacity, boldness, and dominance of the 
new culture within the British Navy and its leaders shines through in the following 








Study of Naval Leaders 
In order to understand how the leadership of the British naval officers contributed 
to the continued success of Great Britain during the period of this study, it is important to 
look at some individual leaders and how they applied their leadership. The following 
pages contain short discussions of the leadership of four selected leaders. 
Admiral Richard Howe 
 Admiral Richard Howe was fortunate enough to be the British fleet commander 
for the first large-scale fleet action of the French Revolutionary War. He was already a 
veteran of previous wars and had fully accepted the new culture of aggressive British 
naval leadership. He was known as a stern but professional officer and had gained the 
esteem of the sailors under his command. He was known to them and his peers by the 
mysteriously enduring nickname of “Black Dick.” 
 Admiral Howe had long been a proponent of the standardization of orders on 
board ships throughout the navy. He was the author of the earliest ships order book that 
survives to this day. Howe even codified the principle of ship's crews working in 
organized divisions in 1776.101 His leadership brought about the effective standardization 
of many of the most important aspects in naval warfare; from crewmember organization 
to improvements of fleet combat signaling. 
 However, Admiral Howe’s most notable accomplishment was his victory against 
the French on what has become known as the Glorious First of June in 1794. The battle 
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came at a time when the fledgling French Republic needed sea access to foreign food 
sources, a risky endeavor with the British Navy mobilizes and looking for a fight. 
 
Figure 1. The Battle of the Glorious First of June. Adapted from a map in the Public 
Domain. 
  
By the time the winter of 1793 came, France was in a miserable state. The county 
was rife with internal conflict as the royalist forces continued to struggle against the 
fledgling Republic of France. There was an active and organized rebellion in the Vendée 
region, and the residents of Toulon had handed their city and port to the British 
Mediterranean fleet, including the French fleet anchored there. These internal problems 
compounded the difficulties France had as it struggled to support its foreign interests with 




However, as the year closed out, France’s situation improved drastically. During 
December, at the Battle of Savenay, the Republican army defeated the last remaining 
forces of the Vendée rebellion. Also in December, the Republican forces were able to 
move artillery batteries into the heights surrounding Toulon. The prospect of French 
artillery in the heights around Toulon necessitated the evacuation of British troops and 
naval resources from Toulon. The British and their Spanish allies attempted to burn the 
French fleet as they relinquished control of the harbor but failed to burn all the ships. 
However, the damage they inflicted on the French fleet significantly weakened the 
French ability to threaten the British Navy in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Even though the French were able to make significant progress in their land 
campaigns to remove the threats in the Vendée and Toulon, the Republic still faced many 
internal struggles and the need to import grain to feed its people. There were riots over 
bread distribution, and France needed to feed its increasingly larger armies on the 
continent. This task was made increasingly difficult by the effectiveness of British naval 
blockades and patrols. The French maritime trade had been cut off almost entirely. 
Maximilien Robespierre, a Deputy of the National Convention, and member of the 
Committee of Public Safety, was able to arrange for a massive convoy of grain from the 
United States of America.102 He sent several warships to escort the convoy and attempted 
to maintain the secrecy of the mission. However, he failed to keep the secret from the 
British. 
                                                 




During April of 1794, the British discovered the existence of the convoy and 
understood the importance of the grain for the stability of the French Republic’s 
government. British authorities made the interception of the grain convoy a top priority. 
Admiral Richard Earl Howe, command of the Channel Fleet, was immediately put to sea 
to attempt to find and destroy the convoy.103 Howe’s fleet sailed with sixteen 74-gun 
ships, two 80-gun ships, three first-rate ships of 100 guns, and three second-rate ships of 
98 guns. The fleet was powerful in the way of firepower, however it suffered greatly 
from manning shortages. Most of the ships in the fleet contained around 80 percent of 
their complement.104 This manning problem offered Howe a severe handicap in fleet 
battle. With inadequate numbers of seamen to work the guns and sail the ships in the 
manner which they were designed, it would take flexibility and the uncommon ability of 
the leadership among the fleet in order to be victorious against the expected French fleet. 
The British formed a two-pronged strategy to prevent the convoy from reaching 
France. First, Howe would use his massive Channel Fleet to blockade the French fleet at 
Brest and prevent it from forming an escort for the convoy. The second prong consistent 
of Rear Admiral George Montagu’s powerful squadron, of six 74-gun ships and three 
frigates, sailing south deep into the Bay of Biscay to intercept the convoy. 
Fortune joined the French side, on May 16th, as a strong storm blew Howe’s fleet 
off their station blockading Brest. The French admiral commanding the fleet at Brest, 
Admiral Louis Thomas Villaret de Joyeuse took this fortunate opportunity to quickly slip 
out of Brest into the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Villaret’s goal was to lure the British fleet 
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away from the grain convoy, so he sailed west into the Atlantic. Once Howe’s fleet had 
recovered from the storm and regrouped, he sailed west in pursuit of Villaret. 
Villaret’s orders were to protect the grain convoy at all costs. In this pursuit, 
Villaret saw his best chance was to delay the British fleet as long as he could through 
defensive tactics, so the convoy could slip into port while the British were trying to 
engage Villaret’s fleet in an extended pursuit. Villaret was under orders to not engage the 
British fleet unless it was necessary to save the grain convoy. On May 28th, the French 
spotted the British fleet on the horizon. Once they were able to discern it was the British, 
enthusiastic Republican fervor spread throughout the fleet as French sailors longed to 
prove their patriotism and merit to France. The fervor was so contagious and motivating, 
the representative of the Committee of Public Safety, Jeanbon Saint André was caught up 
in the enthusiasm. He assented to the widespread call for action and adjusted Villaret’s 
orders to that effect.105 
 For the next three days, the fleets shadowed each other as they sailed west. Each 
fleet struggled to gain the favorable position based on the wind, the wind gauge. On May 
31st, a thick mist came down, and the fleets were unable to maintain clear visibility of 
each other. However, on the morning of June 1st, the mist was blown out by a moderate 
breeze. The French fleet was four miles to the leeward of the British fleet, giving the 
British the advantageous wind gauge. 
 Howe formed up his line of battle and closed with the French to engage them. His 
tactical plan called for all the ships of his line to cut through the line of French ships at 
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the same time. They were then going to engage the French from the leeward side of their 
line and prevent them from escaping. The tactic was audacious and risky. Howe had to 
trust his Captains would not lose their nerve on the approach to the French line. In 
addition to trusting his Captain’s nerves, he had to trust the sailing competence of all the 
crews to be able to pull off the challenging maneuver. 
 Howe’s trust in his subordinates and his audacious tactics amounted to nothing 
less than a ‘glorious’ outcome. Although many of his fleet captains did not follow, or 
understand the signals for the attack, enough of them followed the order to make it a 
success. The British fleet was able to cross through the French line, raking the ships as 
they passed through, and engage the French from the leeward side of the French line. The 
aggressive and bold move took the French by surprise. The raking fire from the British 
ships through the bow and stern of the French ships, as the British passed through the 
French line, crippled many of the French guns and induced heavy casualties. The element 
of surprised and the initial overwhelming damage the British inflicted was the beginning 
of the end for the French. This was followed by superior British gunnery and ship 
handling, leading to a victory for the British. 
 Although the British victory was a tremendous tactical success and led to the 
capture and destruction of several French ships of the line, in light of French strategy, the 
battle was a necessary consequence in order to cover the movement of the grain convoy 
from America. The French saw the battle as a victory for the stability of their nascent 




 Howe’s audacity, and the trust he had in his subordinates’ ability to perform the 
risky tactics, proved he had the important instinct of leadership that came to be the 
standard other leaders would exhibit throughout the rest of the wars with France. 
Vice-Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson 
During the late eighteenth century, and for the first five years of the nineteenth 
century, Britain had an undisputed hero.  This hero was a member of the famed and 
trusted British Navy, the wooden wall protecting Britain from its enemies.  The glorified 
hero was Vice-Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson.  Horatio Nelson’s fame and honor was not 
just a result of luck or the proverbial right place at the right time.  Throughout his career 
his natural leadership characteristics allowed him to inspire a generation of British naval 
officers and seamen to overcome all other navies in the world.  The following pages will 
describe how Nelson’s leadership, uncompromising confidence in English seamen, and 
his unparalleled tenacity in combat was one of the most coherent causes of British naval 
superiority throughout his career and to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. 
It is clear from the many sources available that Nelson had a different leadership 
style from many other Captains in the British Navy.  Even captains that observed the 
success of his leadership style were still unable to emulate it.106 His warm and welcoming 
personality was the foundation of his leadership.  “It is clear that Nelson genuinely 
believed that cordial unanimity and cheerfulness were an essential ingredient of a 
successful team…”107   In contrast to many of his peers, who maintained order through 
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strict discipline and a fearful environment on their ships, Nelson was not only able to 
maintain excellent order on his ships; he was able to foster admiration and respect from 
his men at the same time.  A key difference was Nelson’s fairness and genuine care for 
his men. 
The first key theme of leadership Nelson possessed was the ability to inspire his 
subordinates.  One of the most important aspects of a leader is his ability to inspire 
others.  However, the concept of inspiration can be a very subjective idea.  It is subjective 
because there are many ways a leader can inspire and different levels of inspiration can 
be achieved.  Therefore, the critical point is how a leader inspires and to what degree.  In 
the case of Horatio Nelson, he not only inspired his men to fight better and harder than 
the enemy, but he also inspired his superiors to have hope for the future, and the prospect 
of glory for the British Navy.  Nelson’s inspiration for his superiors is most poignantly 
stated by Lord St. Vincent, John Jervis, in a letter he sent to Nelson after he learned of 
Nelson’s illness following the Battle of Copenhagen.  Jervis had the daunting task of 
finding a replacement for Nelson: 
To find a fit successor, your Lordship well knows, is no easy task, for I never saw 
the man in our Profession, excepting yourself and Troubridge, who possessed the 
magic art of infusing the same spirit into others which inspired his actions…Your 
Lordship’s whole conduct, from your first appointment to this hour is the subject 
of our constant admiration; it does not become me to make comparisons.  All 
agree there is but one Nelson…108 
 
It is easy to see the admiration Jervis had for Nelson’s ability to inspire.  Nelson’s 
ability is so hard to describe Jervis uses the words “magic art.”  He must have been at a 
                                                 




loss of words to explain Nelson’s inspiration to men in concrete terms.  Also, Jervis gives 
a hint of what he thinks Nelson inspires men to do; namely, “infusing the same spirit into 
others which inspired his actions.”  This is an elegant way of Jervis to say that Nelson 
inspires men to take upon them the same intention that Nelson possesses when they 
perform their duties.  They become one in mind and cause with Nelson; an extension of 
him in every way.  In short, everything a leader could want or have. 
The proceedings at the Battle of the Nile gave clear evidence of the inspiration 
Nelson gave to his subordinates, and of the trust they had in his leadership.  The previous 
several weeks before the battle had been spent searching the Mediterranean Sea for the 
French fleet.  Nelson was in command of the fleet searching for the French, and he had 
used the several weeks to drill and train his fleet into a superior fighting force.  The fleet 
reached, “…the highest levels of proficiency in all aspects of its task.  These ships were 
fit champions for England - none better existed - and they would be tested to the limit 
before their work was done.”109 
As the British fleet arrived at Alexandria, they were disappointed to find the 
French fleet was not there.  However, Nelson’s fleet soon discovered the French fleet was 
anchored in Aboukir Bay, just up the coast to the North.   It was already late afternoon as 
Nelson’s fleet approached the French fleet, and there were only a couple of hours of 
daylight left.  Nelson’s tenacity would not let him delay an attack until the next day, and 
his subordinates’ trust in Nelson fighting instinct encouraged them to follow their leader 
wherever he led them.  Their trust in Nelson was so great, and he encouraged them to 
                                                 




such a degree; as Nelson signaled “form line as convenient,” his captains in his vanguard 
competed for the honor of being the first engaged.  They raced each other for the honor of 
pleasing Nelson.110 
The fact that the captains in Nelson’s fleet raced for the honor of being the first 
engaged in a battle so close to darkness and shallow shoals is evidence that they trusted 
him to a great extent.  Common practice and caution would demand a different tactic, one 
of waiting until the morning and a battle in open water.  Nelson inspired them to 
something greater than common practice.  He inspired them to glory, and they lived up to 
the endearing term Nelson used for them, “Band of Brothers.”  Nelson later writes to 
Lord Howe, “I had the happiness to command a band of brothers; therefore, night was to 
my advantage.  Each knew his duty, and I was sure each would feel for a French ship.”111 
The next leadership characteristic embodied in Nelson was his humility when 
dealing with subordinates.  His humility was most likely a result of his middle-class 
upbringing.  He had a personality that made him reluctant to flaunt his position, or to lord 
it over others.  This tendency engendered loyalty to him from sailors and soldiers to 
whom he came into contact.  He felt it was not only important to show respect to fellow 
officers, but also to the lower classes as well.  There are many instances of this occurring.   
On January 27, 1801, Lord Nelson inspected the citadel overlooking Plymouth 
Sound.  Nelson entered the Baroque style and highly decorated main gate to begin the 
inspection.  In honor of the highly respected guest, the Governor of the citadel turned out 
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the main guard, in addition to the duty guard.  Nelson did not want to trouble the main 
guard with standing in parade formation for the duration of the visit.  He asked the 
Governor to turn them in.  After Nelson’s request, the main guard was relieved of their 
additional ceremonial duty.  Only the guard scheduled for the day remained on duty.  
This act of humility did not go unobserved.  Nelson was accompanied on the inspection 
by Captain Hardy and Captain Parker, and he gave them an example of leadership they 
would not soon forget.112 It is easy to imagine the guards of the citadel would have shared 
this story with friends and family within the town of Plymouth; and Nelson’s reputation 
as a caring sea officer growing even more. 
Another leadership characteristic of Nelson was his compassion for his men.  As 
opposed to many officers in the navy, Nelson felt punishments should be evaluated on a 
case by case basis.  He had the critical ability to find a balance between punishment and 
order on his ship.  This ability won him the respect and admiration of the seamen of the 
lower decks.113 He even acted in opposition to the common practices of punishment of 
his time.  While in the West Indies, Nelson showed great compassion for a deserter, Able 
Seaman William Clark.  Clark had been on the run for a year and was found drunk in a 
port town.  Even though it was peacetime, the sentence for desertion was death, and Clark 
was subsequently sentenced to hang during his court-martial hearing.  Nelson disagreed 
with the sentence, pardoning Clark and setting him free.  Nelson was rebuked for his 
decision, but he wrote to the Admiralty, “The law might not have supposed me guilty of 
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murder, but my feelings would have been nearly the same.”114 It is clear that Nelson 
believed there were circumstances where leniency and pardon were appropriate. 
Nelson’s philosophy of discipline balanced three crucial points.  The first point 
was the authoritative discipline administered by his ships’ officers.  It would be wrong to 
say there was disorder on Nelson’s ships because of a lack of discipline.  He expected 
great care to be taken to the order of his ship, the seamanship of his men, and the fighting 
quality of his officers and men.  However, he understood perfection was unattainable, as 
he informed Sir Edward Berry in a letter of 1800: 
Young men will be young men, and we must make allowances.  If you expect to 
find anything like perfection in this world you will be mistaken: therefore do not 
think of little nonsenses too much.  Such strictness as you show to your duty falls 
to the lot of few, and no person in this world is more sensible of you worth and 
goodness in every way than myself.  Let it pass over, and come dine here…115 
 
The second point of this balance of discipline was the self-discipline exhibited by 
his subordinates.  Since his ships were “happy ships,” and the men respected his 
leadership, his officers and men wanted to please him.  In turn, they disciplined 
themselves to prove worthy of Nelson’s leadership and admiration.  The final point of 
Nelson’s discipline philosophy is “what Nelson would have called the discipline of the 
sea.”116 This was the discipline the ship’s crew would place upon themselves as a unit 
that had a collective understanding of what was required of them based on their shared 
situation.  This last point represented the discipline needed to have the most efficient 
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fighting ship possible.  Not only did they discipline themselves because of their leader’s 
authority, or for their respect of their leader, they disciplined themselves because they 
were a cohesive fighting unit with a common goal. 
Foremost in Nelson’s mind, when it came to his ship’s operation, was his crew.  
He repeatedly proved that if a captain was fair and respectful to his men, he could 
maintain discipline with ease.  He also understood that discipline and good order, 
whether in seamanship or in fighting ability, brought about self-respect and pride for a 
crew.  This type of leadership allowed Nelson’s ships to be happy ships, and a great sense 
of esprit de corps developed within his ship’s company.117 It is easy to understand how 
this developed on Nelson’s ships.  He showed respect for his men, and the respect he 
showed for his men was real.  Nelson’s respect for his men can be summed up from a 
heartfelt line he included in a letter to his wife, “Nothing can stop the courage of English 
seamen.”118 
Nelson’s natural tendency to be fair and respectful to his subordinates led him 
also to be loyal and protective of them.  He always strove to keep his crews intact when 
he shifted from ship to ship.  During the British blockade of Toulon in 1793, Nelson 
wrote to his wife, Fanny, and told her Admiral Lord Hood offered him a 74-gun ship.  
Accepting the 74-gun ship would be an important step in his career, as he would then be 
considered the captain of a full-size line of battleship.  Nelson writes the letter to explain 
to Fanny why he turned down the ship.  He cites the wisdom of the admiralty placing him 
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in a 64-gun ship as one of the reasons he turned down the ship.  This reason can be 
discounted because it appears too much to be what he would be expected to say as a loyal 
officer submissive to the Admiralty.  The more convincing answer follow when he tells 
her, “I cannot give up my officers.”119   Based on a careful look at Nelson’s leadership 
characteristics this reason is much more believable.  Although some may say Nelson did 
not want to give up the hybrid 64-gun Agamemnon because it was a quick ship and gave 
him the possibility of pursuit and cruising, the second reason cited by Nelson must be 
given at least as much credibility.  Nelson knew he would not be able to transfer all the 
officers serving under him into the new ship.  Many of those officers and petty officers 
would have served with Nelson since the recommissioning of the Agamemnon earlier in 
the year.  Many others served with Nelson on his previous ships.   
Among the officers Nelson was reluctant to leave was his first lieutenant Martin 
Hinton, who served with Nelson in the West Indies in the Albemarle, his second 
lieutenant Joseph Bullen, who had served with Nelson in Nicaragua, and his third 
lieutenant George Andrews, who served as a midshipman for Nelson in the Boreas.  In 
addition to his lieutenants, he also had several midshipmen, or ‘young gentlemen’ to 
consider.  These young gentlemen included William Hoste and John Weatherfield, sons 
of Norfolk parsons, and William Bolton, the son of his sister’s brother-in-law.  Last of the 
mentionable midshipmen was Nelson’s thirteen-year-old step-son, Josiah Nisbet.120 With 
all these officers to consider, it showed a great deal of selflessness to put his figurative 
promotion into a proper line of battleship on hold in order to keep his crew together.  This 
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selflessness was a clear indication of Nelson’s leadership.  His crew knew they had 
Nelson’s support and protection; in turn, they dedicated themselves to serving Nelson to 
the best of their abilities. 
Nelson’s dedication to his men did not stop with his officers.  He genuinely cared 
about the seaman under his command and undertook to keep them with him as he moved 
from ship to ship through advancement.  Due to standard practices of the time, many of 
the seamen on board a ship would stay with a ship and be unable to follow their captain 
to another ship.  Nelson disapproved of the practices, “[T]he disgust for the seamen to the 
Navy is all owing to the infernal plan of turning them over from ship to ship, so that men 
cannot be attached to their officers, for the officers care two-pence about them.”121 To 
Nelson, it only made practical sense to allow a captain that has trained up and fostered 
respect from his men to be able to take those men into his new ship.  Otherwise, the 
captain has to start over with an untested and unknown crew; a crew that quite possibly 
may have been debilitated by ineffective leadership from the previous captain and 
officers. 
Nelson’s leadership was not only a product of his heroism and ability to inspire, 
but it was also a product of his integrity, especially early in his career.  Throughout his 
career, Nelson exhibited integrity to his duty as a naval captain in many ways.  One of the 
most notable periods of Nelson’s career where he displayed integrity was his service in 
the West Indies; commanding the Boreas frigate.  During this assignment to the West 
Indies, Nelson would become a thorn in the side of the many of the established British 
                                                 




naval and merchant officials in the region.  Nelson quickly recognized the lack of 
adherence to the Navigation Acts in the British controlled territories of the West Indies.  
These officials allowed merchant ships of the United States, and other countries, to carry 
cargo to and from British ports; in direct contradiction to the Navigation Acts.  Nelson’s 
integrity would not allow him to look the other way, and he placed his career in jeopardy 
by confronting the commonly accepted trade practices in the region.  As he saw it: “I 
must either disobey my orders, or disobey Acts of Parliament, which the admiral was 
disobeying.  I determined upon the former, trusting to the uprightness of my intention, 
and believed that my country would not allow me to be ruined by protecting her 
commerce.”122 
His first action upon arriving in Antigua was a clear display of Nelson’s proclivity 
to the proper channels of command.  This display happened after receiving a letter from 
the station commander, Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, indicating Nelson was to take 
orders from the resident commissioner Moutray.  Moutray was a captain of a British 
merchant ship and was not in the navy.  Nelson remarked, “I know of no superior officers 
besides the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty and my seniors of the post list.”123 He 
then, in a very public rebuke, ordered a boat from the Boreas to remove the commodore’s 
broad pennant Moutray had flown as a symbol of his command of the port.124 Since the 
Boreas had just arrived on station in the West Indies, this was probably the first 
interaction his men saw between their captain and another authority.  After this incident, 
Nelson’s men knew without a doubt they were under the command of someone who took 
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his commission as a naval captain seriously and had an implacable sense of duty. Very 
few on his ship would have doubted his integrity toward his duty. 
If this was not enough, as soon as Nelson learned of the complicity in which the 
West Indies squadron was enforcing the Navigation Acts, he confronted Sir Hughes.  
Admiral Hughes claimed he had not been informed of the Orders in Council of the 
Navigation Acts Nelson was citing.  Nelson produced the Orders and Acts to Hughes.  
Hughes made his own interpretation and ordered his officers to allow foreign ships to 
enter harbors if local authorities approved of the shipments.  Nelson knew this was a 
blatant violation of the Act and made this clear to Hughes.  Nelson also started to write to 
other captains in the squadron to garner support.125 Nelson disobeyed Hughes’ orders and 
enforced the letter of the law of the Navigation Acts.   
During May of 1785, Nelson seized the ship Eclipse which was crewed entirely 
by Americans, for violating the Navigation Acts.  The crown lawyer challenged Nelson's 
right to seize the Eclipse.  After personally defending himself in court, Nelson was not 
only found to be in the right; he convinced the crown attorney of the legality of the 
seizure.  Weeks later, Nelson arrested four American ships at Nevis Island.  The four 
ships and their cargoes were declared prizes and sold.  Capturing the four American ships 
brought about a significant degree of local protest and pressure.  The four American 
captains were able to raise enough clamor to threaten Nelson’s arrest.  Nelson remained 
on his ship, fearing arrest if he was to go ashore.  After several months, Nelson was 
                                                 




wholly exonerated and Hughes was ordered by the Admiralty to direct his squadron to 
enforce the Navigations Acts in their entirety.126 
Nelson’s dispute with Sir Richard Hughes would not be the last time he disobeyed 
a superior officer.  There were times when Nelson believed his call to duty was a higher 
priority than following orders.  To Nelson, integrity to duty and tactical effectiveness 
trumped all orders.  There are two battles Nelson fought in that prove Nelson’s dedication 
to integrity to duty and tactical effectiveness.  The first is the Battle of the Cape St. 
Vincent.  During this battle, Nelson recognized a tactical danger and took immediate 
action without orders from his superior officer.  The second battle was the Battle of 
Copenhagen.  During this battle, Nelson ignored signals from his superior officers and 
remained engaged in a battle he knew would be a triumphant British victory.  Below is a 
summary of each of these battles and how Nelson’s leadership characteristics of decisive 
tactical decision making, and his robust sense of integrity to duty, contributed to victory. 
                                                 





Figure 2. The Battle of Cape St. Vincent. Adapted from a map in the Public Domain. 
 
During the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, the captains of the ships in the rear division 
of the British attack were placed in a “professional conundrum.”127 The Admiral in 
command of the fleet, John Jervis, had given a signal to the rear division to tack and 
block the enemy’s flanking maneuver.  Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Thompson, the 
commander of the rear division, either failed to see or ignored the signal.  The 
conundrum the captains of the rear division were placed in was whether they follow the 
signal form Jervis, or follow their divisional commander’s lead straight ahead.  Nelson 
was the first to act.  He ordered his ship, the Captain, to fall out of the formation and 
                                                 




maneuver to a position where he could prevent the Spanish ships from joining together.  
According to the Captain’s logbooks for the day, there was no signal given from 
Thompson’s ship for Nelson’s maneuver.128 Nelson showed a tremendous amount of 
courage when he made this move.  At the time he made his turn, he did not know if other 
ships in the division would follow him.  There was the potential of taking his one ship 
into the heart of the Spanish fleet surrounding the enemy’s flagship.  Fortunately for 
Nelson, the other ships in the division followed Nelson’s maneuver and supported him in 
his brave action.   
At the conclusion of the battle, Nelson and his crew boarded and took the 80-gun 
San Nicholas and the 114-gun San Josef.  Nelson personally led his boarding party onto 
the Spanish ship, the San Nicholas, becoming the first British flag-officer to lead a 
boarding party since 1513.129 He then led his boarding party onto the adjacent Spanish 
flagship, the San Josef.  Nelson’s bravery and willingness to lead from the front, first by 
sailing his ship into the heart of the enemy, and secondly, by personally leading his 
boarding party, ingratiated him to his crew and the British people.  Nelson engendered 
such jovial admiration from the fleet, they named the boarding of one ship to board 
another ship, “Nelson’s patent bridge for boarding first rates.”130 In the end, Nelson’s 
initiative which led him to act without orders from his division commander led him to 
glory and honor, and established him as a bold tactician as well as a effective leader. 
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Figure 3. The Battle of Copenhagen. Adapted from a map in the Public Domain. 
 
The second battle where Nelson chose duty over obeying his superior officer was 
the Battle of Copenhagen of 1801.  During this battle, Nelson led the main attacking 
force from the South to the North through the Copenhagen Road.  Admiral Hyde Parker, 
the commander of the entire fleet, remained to the northeast of the roads and planned to 
move to block any gun boats from sallying out of the harbor.  Starting at 10:40 am, 
Nelson’s divisions of ships engaged in a fierce battle with the Danish ships and ground 
batteries for several hours.  At 1:30 pm, presumably because of his uncertainty of the 
situation and to assess his fleet’s condition, Admiral Parker ordered the signal 
“discontinue the engagement” be raised.131 Nelson ignored the signal and allowed his 
signal of “engage the enemy closer” to fly.  Hours later Nelson was able to secure a 
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ceasefire with the Danish which allowed the British Navy to carry away eleven of the 
Danish ships as prizes.  If Nelson would have followed Parker’s signal, the outcome may 
have been drastically different.  The next day Nelson’s second in command of the attack, 
Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves, wrote to his brother and outlined Nelson’s decision to 
ignore Parker’s signal: 
Lord Nelson was appointed to command this attack, and he 
asked for me to serve with him; if not, you might depend 
on my not staying behind when anything was to be done.  I 
think yesterday must prove that the enterprise of the British 
is invincible…In short, it was worthy of our gallant and 
enterprising little Hero of the Nile.  Nothing can exceed his 
spirit.  Sir Hyde [Parker] made the signal to discontinue the 
action before we had been at it two hours, supposing that 
our ships would all be destroyed.  But our little Hero 
gloriously said, “I will not move till we are crowned with 
victory… ”132 
 
Graves’ letter to his brother gives a clear indication of his view of leadership 
within the fleet.  He gives nothing but praise for Nelson and highlights the defeatism of 
Parker.  If this letter is any indication, Graves would follow Nelson into any battle but 
would think twice about following Parker. 
In the months before the Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson’s leadership within the navy 
was recognized entirely.  Not only did the navy respect and love him, but the British 
public was enthusiastic in their praise of their naval hero.  The words of Able Seaman 
James Martin, aboard the Neptune express the feelings of the fleet when Nelson joined 
the fleet about three weeks before the Battle of Trafalgar, “On the 28th September was 
                                                 




joined by H.M.Ship Victory Admirl Lord Nelson and the Ajax and the Thunderer it is 
Imposeble to Discribe the Heartfelt Satisfaction of the whole fleet upon this Occasion and 
the Confidance of Success with which we ware Inspired.”133 Nelson’s previous successes 
and his unmatched leadership led to inspiration and encouragement for members of the 
fleet, from the flag officers down to the men of the lower decks.  Whatever would happen 
at the future battle of Trafalgar would be a result of Nelson’s leadership. 
As Nelson reviewed his assembled fleet, he saw familiar faces and new faces 
among the captains.  Of the twenty-seven ships of the line in his fleet, only eleven were 
led by captains Nelson had personally served with previously.134 Nelson worked quickly 
to meet the captains he had not served with before.  He used the opportunity of dining 
with them to try to build relationships.  One captain, George Duff, wrote to his wife, “I 
dined with his Lordship yesterday, and had a very merry dinner.  He certainly is the 
pleasantest Admiral I ever served under,”135 and later, “He is so good and pleasant a man, 
that we all wish to do what he likes, without any kind of orders.”136 Captain Duff was 
truly inspired to greatness by building a relationship with Nelson; he even expresses his 
desire to do everything Nelson “likes” without even being asked or ordered. 
Another captain that met Nelson days before the Battle of Trafalgar was Captain 
Codrington.  He describes Nelson’s arrival to the fleet in a letter to his family: 
Lord Nelson is arrived!  A sort of general joy has been the consequence, and 
many good effects will shortly arise from our change of system.  He joined us too 
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late yesterday evening for communication.  I had not got any of your letters 
before I waited on Lord Nelson this morning; he received me in an easy, polite 
manner, and, on giving me your letter, said that, being entrusted with it by a lady, 
he made a point of delivering it himself.  I have no fear of obtaining his good will 
by the conduct of ‘Orion’; because I shall do my best to deserve it, and he is a 
man well able to appreciate such endeavours.137 
 
Codrington excitement upon Nelson’s arrival is self-evident.  He predicts that 
many good changes will be made now that Nelson was with the fleet.  This must come 
from a trust of Nelson’s leadership and administrative abilities.  Codrington ends the 
letter with a sentence alluding to the fact that he is confident he will gain Nelson’s good 
will through the performance of his ship, the Orion.  He trusts Nelson is the type of 
Admiral that will recognize good performance when he sees it.  Codrington proved a man 
of his word.  During the battle, he did everything he could to ‘engage the enemy more 
closely,’ even taking friendly fire from the rearmost British ships as he tried to take the 
Orion into the heat of the battle.138 Codrington was one of the few captains in the rear of 
the line to follow Nelson’s order that if he was unable to get into action by the prescribed 
mode of attack “they might adopt whatever they thought best, provided it led them 
quickly and closely alongside the enemy.”139  In another letter, Codrington comments 
about how Nelson was able to bring his captains together into a happy fighting force, 
“…allow the superiority of Lord Nelson in all these social arrangements which bind his 
captains to their admiral.”140 These ‘social arrangements’ have been recognized as one of 
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Nelson’s most effective tools of leadership.  He molded his men into a team, under his 
leadership, with frequent and ‘merry’ dinners.  “In the days before the battle [of 
Trafalgar], therefore, Nelson held regular dinners and conversations aboard his flagship, 
to get to know his fellow officers and to instill in them, in very general terms, what he 
expected of them in the coming engagement.”141 By the time Nelson rose his famous 
signal, “England expects that every man will do his duty,” Nelson knew his fleet would 
rise to the task ahead of it. 
 
Figure 4. The Battle of Trafalgar. Adapted from a map in the Public Domain. 
 
Admiral Lord Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar has been recognized by 
nineteenth and twentieth-century historians as one of the most critical and pivotal military 
successes in modern British history.  Prodigious amounts of attention have been given to 
                                                 




every aspect of the battle, including; the condition of the Allied fleet, the British 
commanders, Nelson’s tactics, opposing gunnery, and the aftermath of the battle.  This 
increased attention is especially true for the anglophile North American and British 
historians.  These historians have contributed to the perspective that promoted the 
construction of monuments and statues, and the restoration of the HMS Victory, which 
has immortalized the battle and lifted Admiral Lord Nelson to heroic status.  However, 
beyond the personal admiration held for Nelson and the characterization of him as a 
glorious protector of Britain, there are several objective reasons for exalting Nelson’s 
victory at Trafalgar.  These include, but are not limited to, the subsequent British naval 
strategic dominance for the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars and the weakening of 
Spain as an imperial power. 
 The first reason so much attention has been given to the Battle of Trafalgar is the 
subsequent naval strategic dominance Britain achieved, and it cannot be emphasized 
enough.  In his discussion of the aftermath of the Battle of Trafalgar in his book, The 
Command of the Ocean, N.A.M. Rodger states, “…Britain had an unchallenged 
command of the sea, in quantity and quality, materially and psychologically, over all her 
actual or potential enemies, which she had never known before.”142 This dominance 
allowed Britain to take risks and to explore new strategic realities.  Among these were 
“expeditions to recapture Cape of Good Hope and the islands in the West Indies.”143 
Britain also made some unsuccessful expeditions to Montevideo and Buenos Aires.144 
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 The strategic dominance was also a practical advantage to British global logistics.  
Britain was able to expand trade routes and capacity with the reduced threat from enemy 
squadrons.145 This allowed Britain to maintain a flow of foreign supplies to its people.  It 
also allowed Britain to resupply its armies anywhere in the world and to choke off 
supplies to its enemies.  Effective blockades of enemy ports, and tenacious trade route 
raiding, forced Britain’s enemies to make a desperate search for overland supply routes.  
This problem was especially distinct for France and Spain.  Spain was a peninsula 
attached to Europe at its border with France, and France was in constant conflict on its 
Eastern front. 
 The British naval dominance was especially bothersome to Napoleon’s strategy.  
With many enemies on France’s Eastern front, Napoleon desperately needed to 
consolidate his resources to the Eastern front.  Therefore, he needed to reduce Britain’s 
effectiveness or remove them from the war altogether.  However, without the ability to 
stop the economic trade from flowing to and from Britain with the French or Spanish 
navies, he would not be able to interrupt Britain’s source of power.146 
 The second reason why Britain’s victory has received so much attention is it had a 
significant effect on the Spanish ability to be an imperial power.  Spain’s influence in the 
world, based on its trade from the New World depended on its strong naval power.  At 
Trafalgar, the Spanish fleet it needed to maintain this imperial power was sacrificed for 
the French strategic efforts in the Mediterranean.147 
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Writing about leadership can be difficult.  It is difficult because for most people it 
can be difficult to explain why someone is a good leader, while others are bad leaders.  
Leadership can be a very abstract quality.  It can be a quality that is difficult to describe.  
However, when writing about Lord Nelson’s life, leadership becomes the topic of 
discussion.  Nelson so epitomized leadership among the British Navy in his lifetime, that 
a discussion about the period cannot, without difficulty, avoid a discussion about him.  
His inspiration to the British Navy and the nation became the key to success.  His respect 
and fairness to his men endeared him to generations of British people.  His integrity to his 
duty made him many political enemies, but it exposed his passions.  He led the British 
Navy and nation until his end.  Some of his last words sum up his passion for integrity to 
duty, “Thank God I have done my duty.”148 
Admiral Sir Edward Pellew 
 Sir Edward Pellew, First Viscount Exmouth, gained his title due to the 
extraordinary sea service he gave to Great Britain. His humble beginnings did not 
indicate he would end up Vice-Admiral of England, and one of the greatest frigate 
captains of his period. Even though his beginnings did not point to greatness, they did 
point him to sea service. His father was a packet ship captain out of Dover. Sir Edward’s 
early life gave him a solid foundation for his future on the oceans of the world. Besides 
being, in the words of Alfred Mahan, “a born frigate captain,”149 Sir Edward went on to 
be the Commander in Chief of the East Indies, and the Commander in Chief of the 
Mediterranean fleet. 
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 As a frigate captain during the French Revolutionary War, Pellew nearly reached 
legendary status. “He was, arguably, the most successful of frigate captains of the earlier 
part of the Revolutionary War and his capture, in single combats, of two French frigates – 
La Cléopâtre in 1793 and La Virginie in 1796 – and the driving ashore of the 74-gun 
French line of battle ship Les Droits de l’Homme in 1797, must place him in the forefront 
of any pantheon of naval officers of this period.”150  
He was known to be an excellent judge of men and had a gifted ability to 
recognize the best suitability of men for his crew. He matched the ability and personality 
of men to the most appropriate assignment and division on his ship. One of the most 
notable examples of this ability was in 1793 when Pellew was first appointed a captain in 
the frigate Nymphe. Short of his ships complement of men and unable to locate enough 
seamen, Sir Edward decided to recruit among the Cornish miners of his region of birth. 
He knew the miners were hardy and hard-working men, accustomed to climbing, and the 
use of ropes and gunpowder, from the Cornish type of mining. This system of mining led 
the men to be accustomed to strict obedience and sometimes forced the lowest level men 
to make crucial decisions based on their own judgment. Also, Pellew knew well of the 
local past-time sport of wrestling and determined the toughness and experience in this 
martial sport would only make better sailors in combat. All these traits led Pellew to 
know the miners would make the best seamen of all landsmen.151  
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 Pellew’s trust in the ability of the miners proved correct. In the Nymphe’s first 
single combat under Pellew’s command, against the French La Cléopâtre, the fighting 
effectiveness of the crew exceeded all expectations. The La Cléopâtre was a larger frigate 
and had a much larger crew. However, the Nymph’s crew exchanged a cannonade with 
French frigate for 50 minutes before boarding and capturing. Both ships suffered heavy 
casualties, but in the end the Nymphe was victorious even after ending the battle with 67 
fewer men. Pellew’s good judgment of his ship’s crew led to the first enemy ship 
captured in the war.152 
 Not only did Pellew possess sound judgment in the capabilities of men, but he 
was also heroic in his efforts to save the lives of those he could. In 1795 alone, he risked 
himself three times to save the lives of his sailors. In one instance, his dinner was 
interrupted after a cutter being hoisted onboard had fallen when some tackle broke. 
Through a course of events, several men were overboard in the water. Pellew ordered he 
be lowered in his gig to rescue the men, over the protest of many of his officers. The gig 
was quickly destroyed by the rough seas, and Pellew was injured after colliding with the 
rudder of his ship. He called for a rope to be thrown to him, lashed himself to one of his 
sailors, and ordered those on the ship to haul them up.153 Pellew’s repeated self-sacrificial 
acts of courage led his men to admire and respect him. 
 John Gaze, a man that served for nearly 30 years at sea, summarized Pellew’s 
ability to lead seamen: 
No man ever knew better how to manage seamen. He was very attentive to 
their wants and habits. When he was a captain, he personally directed 
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them; and when the duty was over, he was a great promoter of dancing 
and other sports, such as running aloft, heaving the lead, &c., in which he 
was himself a great proficient. He was steady in his discipline, and knew 
well the proper time to tighten and relax. He studied much the character of 
his men, and could soon ascertain whether a man was likely to appreciate 
forgiveness, or whether he could not be reclaimed without punishment. 
During the whole time he commanded frigates, his men had leave in port, 
one third at a time, and very rarely a desertion took place.154 
 
 Gaze’s insight into Pellew’s leadership reveals a great deal about the relationship 
between him and his men. Pellew appears to be a very engaged leader who worked side 
by side with his men until all the duties were complete, and when all was complete, 
allowed his men to engage in recreation and mirth. He even lowered his station by 
participating in this recreation with his men. Participating in his men’s recreation no 
doubt earned the respect and trust of his men. This respect and trust reduced the chance 
of desertion among Sir Edward’s men and most likely increased his ability to recruit new 
men. In times when manning ships was a challenge, this characteristic in a leader gave 
him a significant advantage. 
 Sir Edward excelled in strategy and tactics. During the mutiny at the Nore, he was 
able to keep his squadron of frigates free from the mutiny and active within the English 
Channel. Sir Edward intentionally brought his ships in close to shore in several different 
French coastal regions, to make his squadron appear to be a force more extensive than it 
was.155 Tactically, he was a careful and aggressive combatant. Every morning at dawn, 
when his ship’s crew was beat to quarters, he would have the reefs shaken out of the sails 
and sail booms rigged out, in anticipation of an enemy ship being sighted at first light. Sir 
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Edward’s ship would be ready for the chase immediately, giving him the advantage of 
several minutes over his chase.156 These strategic and tactical practices were just some of 
the leadership traits that allowed Sir Edward to make an impact in the English Channel. 
 Sir Edward continued his leadership much later in the war as he commanded the 
British fleet in the East Indies. His ability as a leader and diplomat allowed him to 
operate the East Indies fleet in a manner that maintained important alliances and 
protected the trade operation of the East India Company.  
Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Lord Collingwood 
 A study of leadership that touches on the leadership of Vice-Admiral Nelson 
inevitably will touch on the career and leadership of Vice-Admiral Cuthbert 
Collingwood. For one to say the two were merely contemporaries fails to recognize the 
very close relationship the two had with each other, and the close trajectory their careers 
followed from their nascent friendship which began during their service in the West 
Indies. Not only was Collingwood a great friend and confidant of Nelson, but he was also 
a great leader in his own right. Although his personality was more subdued than 
Nelson’s, Collingwood possessed many excellent leadership abilities, including; 
compassion for his sailors, a strict sense of duty and discipline, and confidence that 
inspired his subordinates to greatness. 
 Collingwood’s leadership abilities are reflected in his successes, but also in what 
his contemporaries wrote about him. One of his midshipmen, Jeffrey Raigersfeld, the son 
of an Austrian baron, wrote, “He was a reserved man, a good seaman and navigator, and 
                                                 




well-read in the English classics; and most heartily do I thank him for the care and pains 
he took to make me a seaman.”157 The respect and warm sentiment of Raigersfeld’s 
words make it clear Collingwood was the type of leader that gained the admiration of his 
subordinates. 
 However, this study must return to the successes of Collingwood, and how those 
successes were evidence of his leadership ability. Although most of Collingwood’s career 
was spent according to the title of Denis Orde’s book, “In the Shadow of Nelson,”158 after 
the death of Nelson the important command in the Mediterranean Sea was successfully 
lead by Collingwood until his own death in 1810. This command was central to the 
maintenance of British interests and alliances necessary for the eventually defeat of the 
French Republic.  
 During his command in the Mediterranean, he was responsible for many fronts of 
the war. His fleet protected the British base on Malta and was the primary defender of 
Sicily. The defense of these two islands allowed the British to divide the Mediterranean 
and to control the trade throughout the majority of the trade routes. Collingwood’s fleet 
successfully supported Russia against the Ottoman Empire, until the Russians became 
allies with France. The fleet then prevented the French from threatening the Ottoman 
Empire from the French positions in the Ionian Islands. During the same period, 
Collingwood’s fleet successfully restricted the French resupply efforts and supported 
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Duke Wellington’s ground forces against the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.159 
These successes taken individually may seem unimpressive. However, when the vast size 
of the Mediterranean Sea and the limited resources Collingwood had at his disposal to 
deal with all the threats are considered, it is difficult to ignore the greatness of his ability 
to lead and inspire his fleet. 
Collingwood’s leadership has also been seen in his ability to maintain order and 
discipline on his ships. Early in his career, when he led his own ships as a captain, he 
gained a reputation of being able to maintain the highest levels of discipline without 
resorting to the harsh punishments common for the time. Collingwood took great care to 
maintain discipline on his ship by keeping the men occupied with worthwhile and 
productive activities. He avoided allowing the idle time of his men to lead them to 
discipline problems and the need to enact punishment. In a letter, he described this 
challenge to his father-in-law, “My wits are ever at work to keep my people employed, 
both for the health’s sake, and to save them from mischief. We have lately been making 
musical instruments, and have now a very good band. Every moonlight the sailors dance; 
and there seems so much mirth and festivity as if we were in Wapping itself.”160 He 
exhibited great wisdom to indulge his men’s interests in music and dancing in order to 
maintain discipline on his ship. 
Collingwood was never a flogging Captain. He was credited with saying, “I 
cannot for the life of me comprehend the religion of an officer who prays all one day and 
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flogs his men all the next.”161 On board his ships he was known as a merciful man; the 
punishment for many offenses on board his ships was the performance of extra duty of 
menial tasks. Many of the punishments he gave were designed to shame or embarrass the 
offender. Collingwood effectively used the peer pressure of the offender’s messmates to 
make needed corrections to discipline. In this area, Collingwood was seen as a pioneer in 
an age of brutality.162 
Collingwood’s philosophy toward punishment, and his personal devotion to the 
leadership of his men was most likely affected by an experience he had when he first 
became a commissioned officer in the West Indies. He was commissioned into the 
Hornet as the first lieutenant to Captain Haswell. Haswell was known to be tyrannical 
and unpopular with his men. Collingwood’s letter to his brother outlines the experience: 
I cou’d tell them fortune was not to blame so much as they suppose, I 
blame her only for placing me under the command of a man, who has 
taken all the pains he cou’d to make himself detested, and so far has he 
succeeded that I am convinced there is not a man or officer in the Ship 
that wou’d not consider a removal as a kind promotion. For my own part 
knew I the least of Admiral Gayton, had I been lucky enough to have has 
a letter form Capt. Roddam to him I wou’d not have hesitated asking to 
remove me: indeed, those who I believe to be most my friends advise me 
to do so as it is. Midshipmen, mates and those who were more dependant 
on him and obliged to bear every indignity he exposed them to have 
quited the ship every one, so that the whole business of the ship rests on 
me, without an assistant; the fatigue I undergo is inconsiderable to what I 
suffer from the insolent manners of a strange compound of extravagant 
pride, and abject meanness.163 
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Collingwood’s experience serving on the Hornet under Captain Haswell gave him 
an example of what a captain should not do. He saw that tyrannical behavior and harsh 
punishments did not lead to respect or higher performance. All indications show that 
Collingwood learned from this experience and developed a leadership style that was the 
antithesis of Haswell. 
He developed a leadership style that looked out for the well-being of his men. 
This style and Collingwood’s care for his men was tested and observed to be genuine. 
However, nonetheless, Collingwood also new that happy men who were properly trained 
in the art of war made the most efficient sailors. He understood that morale was one of 
the most valuable tools he had for the proper operation of his ship. He also understood 
morale was one of the best weapons he could use to the dismay of his combat opponents. 
Therefore, Collingwood strove to care not only for the healthy bodies of his sailors but 
also healthy minds. He used clever and creative ways to keep his men occupied in efforts 
that would keep their minds off of vices while fostering teamwork and comradery. 
Among these productive distractions were the musical escapades mentioned above, as 
well as theatrical performances, and ship maintenance details.164 
Although Collingwood’s career did not include as many fleet actions as the 
unmatchable career of Nelson, he was present for some of the greatest events of the 
period. As captain of the Barfleur, he contributed a significant role to the British victory 
at the battle of the Glorious First of June. While captain of the Excellent he and Nelson 
worked together like two twins sharing and finishing each other’s thoughts, to absolutely 
                                                 




devastate and embarrass the Spanish fleet at the battle of Cape St. Vincent. Finally, 
leading his division of ships and working alongside his oldest and dearest friend, Nelson, 
Collingwood was key to the victory at the Battle of Trafalgar. The battle’s outcome was 
foreshadowed by Collingwood’s words to his officers before the battle, “Now, 
gentlemen, let us do something today which the world may talk of hereafter.”165  
Moreover, just as at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, Collingwood and Nelson were 
again thinking of each other and of one accord. Collingwood had the distinction and 
honor of entering the combat first, leading his division in the Royal Sovereign, and in 
delight Nelson said to his captain, “Look at that noble fellow Collingwood, how he leads 
his division into action!”166 In return, Collingwood’s thoughts moved to Nelson as he 
said, “What would Nelson give to be here!”167 It is no small wonder Nelson and 
Collingwood have gone down in history as two of the greatest leaders in naval history; 
they thought about others and duty at the defining hour of their careers and the future of 
their nation. 
After the bitter-sweet victory at the Battle of Trafalgar, Collingwood found 
himself in command of a heavily damaged British fleet, and the addition of four crippled 
prize ships. His wisdom and leadership revealed itself when he sent a letter to the 
Governor of Cadiz, a Spanish authority, and offered to repatriate all the wounded Spanish 
sailors so they could receive proper treatment. This action had the two-fold effect of 
alleviating the need for the British to care for the Spanish wounded, and to make an 
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unnecessary gesture of humanity to the Spanish. The Spanish were so touched by the 
magnanimous offer, the Marquis of Solano replied to Collingwood that Spain would also 
treat the British wounded in their hospitals and swore on the honor of Spain that the 
British would be treated well.168  
During the twilight of Collingwood’s career his leadership, patience, and 
commitment to duty allowed the British to hold an unmatchable strategic advantage over 
the French by controlling the Mediterranean Sea. This control was aptly summarized by 
Denis Orde: 
And so, for all the monotony and burden of his duty, Collingwood 
stuck faithfully to his task and continued as before, maintaining a tight 
and efficient vigil and blockade in the Mediterranean day after day, week 
after week and month after month. And it was totally successful, for 
Ganteaume’s abortive sally to Corfu was the very last time the French 
ventures out into the Mediterranean while Collingwood was there. And at 
no time during this tenure of command did the British bases at Sicily and 
Malta ever fall to the enemy.169 
 
 Collingwood’s compassion and dedication to his sailors, his unmatched integrity 
and humanity, and his patient laboring for the sake of duty, made him a great leader. 
Even though most of his career was spent in the shadow of Nelson, Collingwood’s 
personal and leadership traits, which differed in presentation from the rousing and 
outgoing Nelson, shown through to be equal to any naval leader of the time. His example 
was noted by his contemporaries and has survived the test of scrutiny over the past two 
centuries. 
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Conclusion: Legacy of Leadership 
 On January 8, 1806, a clear and calm day, with sleet on the ground from a 
hailstorm the day before, the Dead March from Handel’s Saul echoed from the Admiralty 
office gates and continued throughout the streets of London along the route to St. Paul’s 
Cathedral. A troop of Royal Dragoons led the funeral procession of Vice-Admiral 
Horatio Lord Nelson at a solemn pace. Nearly ten thousand soldiers with black shakos 
over their red uniforms followed the dragoons. They were followed by forty-six members 
of the HMS Victory, bearing the white St. George’s ensign that flew over their ship in the 
Battle of Trafalgar. The flag was riddled with holes from the battle that claimed their 
leader’s life. Following the sailors were thirty-one admirals and one hundred sea 
captains.170 
Those officiating the funeral had deemed it appropriate for the Victory’s 
crewmembers to place the folded ensign on the coffin of Nelson. At the last moment, in 
an unorthodox and resolute manner, indicative of the manner of their fallen leader, the 
sailors tore the ensign in pieces so they could take a memento of Nelson with them. The 
surrounding mourners watched in horror because they did not understand what was 
happening. The assembled naval leaders approved, and Lady Codrington said, “That was 
Nelson.”171The sailors held such a tremendous admiration for their leader they could not 
bear to be separated from him entirely. Nelson had inspired them to accomplished feats 
they had never thought imaginable. Their respect and adoration for their leader rose 
above all decorum. 
                                                 
170 Herman, To Rule the Waves : How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World, 397. 




 The city and nation mourned the loss of their great naval leader. However, Nelson 
was not the whole navy. There were still officers serving throughout the world leading 
British sailors to victory and honor. Even after all Nelson achieved, he was only a symbol 
of something greater than himself. He was a symbol of the British naval officer corps. He 
was a symbol of the evolution in leadership that had occurred since that fateful day in 
1757 when another scrap of fabric, Byng’s handkerchief, signaled the end of a different 
era of leadership. 
 The transition of the British Navy after Byng went beyond empirical factors that 
can be measured and counted. It was not impacted so much by the number of ships each 
nation had, or by unmatched technological advances. The transformation occurred in the 
leadership of the navy. It was the result of what the preeminent British naval scholar 
N.A.M Rodger calls, “a steady mounting psychological ascendancy.”172 
 This psychological ascendancy had a double effect on the outcome of naval 
operations. The primary effect was to imbue courage and an aggressive determination 
into the British officers. In turn, this allowed the officers to inspire their men to achieve 
greater heights of efficiency and competence. A secondary effect was to discourage the 
enemies of the British navy. The officers of the navies opposing the British came to 
expect to be defeated.173 They lost hope in their ability to withstand the British navy’s 
tenacity. 
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 The psychological ascendancy is difficult to contextualize. However, this study of 
the origins, training, and development of British naval officers, in addition to the 
aggressive culture developed among the officer corps, offers strong evidence of how the 
ascendancy was achieved. The culture of the careful and deliberate navy before Byng’s 
execution was eclipsed by the unpredictable and relentless navy which developed from 
the early reforms of Hawke and was embodied in the image of Nelson. 
  The legacy of this new form of British naval leadership would continue 
throughout the nineteenth century, leading to one of the most successful periods of 
British imperial expansion and influence the world has seen. For nearly a century, 
throughout the period known as the Pax Britannica, Britain was truly feared as the ruler 
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